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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I study underinvestment and overinvestment theories by
examining the value creation and destruction in hospitality firms in three separate but
coherent and cohesive research papers. In the first study, I analyze the extent to which
financial constraints (underinvestment) and corporate governance (overinvestment) affect
hotel firms’ value around acquisition announcements. In addition to the traditional form
of corporate structure (i.e., C-corporation), hotel firms extensively adopt the
organizational forms of franchising and REIT, which might affect under- and
overinvestment problems. Nonetheless, little is known whether capital investments create
or reduce value for hotel-REITs and franchising hotel firms. The results show that
acquisitions are viewed as overinvestments in franchising and hotel-REIT firms,
suggesting that hotel firms adopt franchising and REIT to reduce overinvestment and
agency problems. Although the average effect of financial constraints is larger for
financially constrained firms, weak corporate governance seems to be more problematic
than financial constraints for hotel firms. In the second study, I examine the sensitivity of
capital and franchising investments to internal funds in the hotel industry. While
financially constrained firms rely on internal funds to reduce underinvestment problems,
they may also rely on franchising to expand their investments. However, if firms are not
constrained, internal funds may lead to overinvestment problems and franchising may
exacerbate problems with empire building. By estimating the investment-cash flow
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sensitivity, I find that the availability of internal funds reduces underinvestment problems
more than it causes overinvestment problems. Furthermore, both financial constraints and
agency costs lead firms to expand through franchising. In the third study, I investigate the
relationship between marginal cash and firm value and the extent to which franchising,
financial constraints, and corporate governance affect this relationship in hotel firms. The
results show that cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms relative to
unconstrained firms, while it is less valuable for poorly-governed firms relative to wellgoverned firms. Also, financial constraints have a greater effect on the marginal value of
cash than weak corporate governance. While franchising could solve underinvestment
problems, it makes poorly-governed firms more vulnerable to overinvestment.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Most hospitality firms adopt the organizational form of franchising business
investment model, which requires little or no capital investment. Yet, they also undertake
investments that require substantial capital investment such as development and
acquisition of hotel properties and mergers. The quote by Marriott sums up the
idiosyncratic characteristics of the hospitality industry in terms of adopted business
model, and investment and financing strategies.
“Our emphasis on long-term management contracts and
franchising tends to provide more stable earnings in periods of
economic softness, while adding new hotels to our system generates
growth, typically with little or no investment by the company…. We,
along with owners and franchisees, continue to invest in our brands by
means of new, refreshed, and reinvented properties, new room and
public space designs, and enhanced amenities and technology
offerings.”
It is clearly stated in the Marriott’s management discussion and analysis of
financial condition statements above that franchising and management contracts are
chosen to expand the business.
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The hotel industry has different characteristics than other industries given the fact
that it adopts franchising business model extensively for investment and expansion with
no or little capital investment. Furthermore, unlike other industries, such as
manufacturing industries, service is the main product in the hotel industry. The intangible
and perishable attributes of the hotel industry’s end-product; service hinder the mass
production and storage of the product for future use, as opposed to other industries, such
as manufacturing industries, where the end-product is tangible and durable. Nonetheless,
investments in the hotel industry requires substantial capital spending for delivering the
service, which makes hotel business, similar to manufacturing industries, a capitalintensive industry. While the firms in the hotel industry undertake investments that
require substantial capital, such as mergers and acquisitions, which are prevalent
corporate strategies in the hotel industry (Canina, Kim, & Ma, 2010), they extensively
rely on franchising for expansion and growth. Typically, franchisors do not need
substantial capital resources for franchising investments, which could be used as an
alternative investment tool when franchisors lack necessary capital to expand the
business (Hunt, 1973). Furthermore, hotel investments may take a large amount of time
to build a new hotel project considering the fact that developing a new hotel division
requires not only financing the project but also requires meeting local standards and
approvals, such as zoning, land use, and site development. However, it may be difficult
for a firm to simultaneously operationalize these investments national and/or global level
and reach economies of scale. Therefore, in an era of global economy, franchising could
be an efficient investment model for firms in the service industry to rapidly meet the
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increased demands of fast-growing economy. Additionally, the majority of the hotel
investments consist of properties, which depreciate in value by time and require
maintenance, refurbishment, and renewal; hence, they require periodic capital
expenditures to maintain the service quality. Hotel guests continue to demand enhanced
hotel facilities and amenities, which necessitate a continuing investment in innovative
and advanced technologies. Therefore, the high level of competition in local, regional,
and global scale in the hotel industry may put hotel companies out of business if they
cannot provide the contemporary facilities and amenities. Furthermore, hotel firms aim to
increase their market shares by building a recognized brand name, which requires a rapid
growth by increasing the sales within the existing hotel properties and/or
developing/acquisitions of new hotels. Similar to franchising investments, acquisitions
also allow firms to expand rapidly in both domestic and foreign markets, as the
acquisition strategy eliminates the time necessary for developing a new hotel project from
the ground. However, franchising is especially beneficial for franchisors in international
expansions because it enables firms to expand into foreign markets with bearing little or
no capital investment risk, in which the risk is shifted to the franchisee in exchange for
the franchisor’s expertise and brand name (Alon, Ni, & Wang, 2012).
There are two plausible theories that explain why firms adopt franchising as an
investment tool. First, capital scarcity theory posits that firms adopt franchising as an
alternative to company-owned investment because raising external finance through debt
or equity markets makes the net present value (NPV, hereafter) of the company-owned
unit investment negative. Thus, firms with growth prospects expand through franchising
in order to fund the growth because they do not need to allocate substantial capital for
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expansion through franchising (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-1969; Oxenfeldt & Thompson,
1968-1969). Along the same line, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there are
informational asymmetries between firms and outside investors, and raising capital to
undertake investments beyond the internal funds could be costly. In other words, Myers
and Majluf (1984) put forwards the idea that if internal funds are not sufficient to
undertake a positive NPV project, firms will bypass the project because raising external
funds increases the project’s cost to a level that makes the positive NPV project negative.
Thus, firms face underinvestment problem due to financial constraints since they cannot
undertake all value-increasing projects. Accordingly, the organizational form of
franchising could be a solution to reduce underinvestment problem for hotel firms that
face asymmetric information problems.
Second, agency theory asserts that firms adopt franchising to eliminate agency
costs that arise due to incentive conflicts between unit managers and the firm (Brickley &
Dark, 1987; Brickley, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991). In other words, firms can eliminate the
agency costs generated by separation of ownership and control through franchising
because franchised units are compensated by the residual claims of their particular units,
while a fixed salary compensates unit managers. However, the agency theory argues that
franchised units are not free of agency costs, and thus a conflict of interests may arise
between franchised units and the firm. In general, the conflict of interests between the
franchisees and the firm arise from franchisees’ incentives to free ride on the trademark
(free riding) by providing low quality service to non-repeat customers, whereas
disparities between unit managers and the firm may arise from managerial shirking and
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perquisites taking (Lafontaine, 1992). Although firms can monitor the unit managers’
performances, the monitoring cost is so high that it makes the investment unprofitable.
While a number of studies examined the determinants of investing in franchises,
the effects of franchising on hotel firms’ overall value, on hotel firms’ marginal value of
cash, and the relation between internal funds and hotel firms’ investments along the lines
of financial constraints and exposure to empire building have not been studied at least in
the English published literature. Nicolau (2002) analyzes the announcement of the
opening new hotel effects on firm’s performance, and Graf (2009) examines the effects of
hotel entry mode choices (franchise, management contract, and company-owned hotel) to
international markets on firm’s performance. However, previous studies that test the
capital scarcity theory consider all franchising firms as having external financing
problems at the same level. Therefore, empirical studies, which examine the capital
scarcity theory of franchising, lack serious identification problems regarding the capital
scarcity of the firms because the degree of financial constraints may vary greatly across
firms. A method that classifies firms as constrained and unconstrained based on the
degree of financial constraints is necessary to test whether firms adopt franchising due
capital scarcity. Beginning with the seminal work by Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder,
and Poterba (1988) that links investment-cash flow sensitivity to financial constraints, a
number of financial constraint indices have been developed to identify firms’ financial
constraint levels (see e.g., Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Hennessy & Whited,
2007; Lamont, Polk, & Saa-Requejo, 2001; Whited & Wu, 2006). The classification
based on these indices are expected to resolve the methodological flaw in previous
empirical studies that examine the capital scarcity theory of franchising by showing the
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extent to which unavailability of internal funds lead constrained and unconstrained firms
to expand through franchising. Furthermore, former studies do not investigate to what
extent franchising affect the underinvestment and overinvestment problems in the hotel
industry. Questions such as why firms adopt the franchising business investment model,
how is firm value affected along the dimensions of franchising and capital investment,
and the extent to which financial constraints (underinvestment) and exposure to empire
building (overinvestment) affect firms’ investments and firm value remain to be
answered.
The capital scarcity theory of franchising and asymmetric information problems
suggests that financial constraints lead hotel firms to adopt the franchising business
investment model. Thus, the following proposition is offered for testing purposes:
Proposition 1: availability of internal funds lead hotel firms to undertake capital
investments.
Proposition 2: under- and overinvestment problems moderate the relationship
between internal funds and capital investments.
The agency theory of franchising suggests that firms adopt franchising when the
agency costs that are associated with the disparity between unit managers and the firm are
higher than the agency costs that are associated with the conflict of interests between
franchised units and the firm. Therefore, the following proposition is offered based on the
agency theory of franchising for testing purposes:
Proposition 3: monitoring costs of unit managers lead hotel firms to adopt the
franchising business investment model.
6

One of the main objectives of the firm is to maximize shareholders’ value, and the
value is maximized when the optimal investment level is reached. Accordingly,
deviations from the optimal investment level deteriorate firm value. An investment below
(underinvestment) or above (overinvestment) the optimal investment level deteriorates
firm value. While the irrelevance theorem developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958)
postulates that firms’ investment decisions are independent from financing decisions, a
stream of literature finds support for the underinvestment problem described by Myers
and Majluf (1984) showing that financially constrained firms rely on internal funds for
investments more than unconstrained firms (see e.g., Lamont et al., 2001). In addition to
expanding through franchising, hotel firms make investments that require substantial
capital spending, such as developing/building and acquisitions of hotels to reach their
optimum investment level and maximize firm value. This particular investment method
makes the hotel business a capital-intensive industry similar to manufacturing industries
(Houthakker, 1979; Tsai & Gu, 2012). The majority of the hotel investment consists of
properties, which depreciate in value by time and require maintenance, refurbishment,
and renewal. Hence, these investments require periodic capital expenditures to maintain
the service quality. However, it may be difficult for a firm to simultaneously
operationalize these investments at national and/or global level and to reach economies of
scale. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms will bypass all projects that require
financing beyond internal resources because raising external finance will make the
projects unprofitable. Therefore, firms will rely on internal funds (i.e., cash and cash
flow) to undertake capital investments and hence they may face underinvestment
problems.
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Contrary to the financial constraint theoretical framework, investment-cash flow
sensitivity could be due to managerial overinvestment of free cash flow (i.e., resources at
managers’ discretion) (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). On one hand, investment-internal
funds sensitivity might be an indication of financial constraints and hence it suggests
underinvestment problem (Fazzari et al., 1988). On the other hand, the relationship
between internal funds and investments could also be due to exposure to empire building
and hence it suggests overinvestment problem (Stein, 2003). According to Jensen (1986),
managers of firms with free cash flow may invest beyond the optimal investment level by
undertaking value-decreasing projects to build empires. While the availability of internal
funds may reduce underinvestment problems described in Myers and Majluf (1984), it
may intensify overinvestment problems described in Jensen (1986). Although investors
and the capital market may enact internal and external governance mechanisms to control
managerial desire to build empires, there are strategies in which managers can protect
their positions against the disciplinary role of capital market. Market for corporate control
is one of the external governance mechanisms that disciplines managers of firms through
takeover threat (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). However, antitakeover provisions (or ATPs,
lawful rules that protect corporations against takeovers) reduce the probability of
takeover; hence, they protect managers from being replaced. Additionally, the existence
of major shareholders provide an internal governance mechanism to control managers’
actions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Much of the existing research tested these theories on
overall stock markets including all industries1. Although the results of existing research
could be generalizable across all industries, it may not well capture industry idiosyncratic

1

Most of these studies excluded regulated industries such as financial firms.
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characteristics such as the hotel industry. Furthermore, it is a stylized fact that franchising
is the most commonly adopted business investment model in the hotel industry. To void
this gap in the literature, this dissertation therefore examines the effects underinvestment
and overinvestment and the organizational forms of franchising and REIT on hotels’ firm
value, investment-internal funds sensitivity, and the value of cash holdings.
While sensitivity of capital investment to internal funds is well documented, little
is known the extent to which this relationship is due to financial constraint or empire
building (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Stein, 2003). Thus, while firms may adopt
franchising due to financial constraints, they may also be exposed to empire building if
managers seek private benefits. In other words, although the informational asymmetries
and the capital scarcity theory of franchising suggest that firms adopt franchising as a
solution to reduce underinvestment problem, there are at least two ways, in which
franchising firms may overinvest. First, most hotel firms undertake investments that
require substantial capital spending (e.g. company-owned hotel investments and
acquisitions) in addition to franchising investments. Jensen (1986) argues that managers
of firms with free cash flows and unused borrowing powers are more likely to complete
negative NPV projects. Thus, an investment that requires substantial capital spending like
the development or the acquisition of a hotel could be an overinvestment. Accordingly,
managers of firms with desires to build empires may undertake investments that benefit
them but not necessarily the shareholders. Hence, hotel firms that adopt the franchising
investment business model might also face overinvestment problems. Second, in a model
where market share is considered as an investment, Chevalier (1995) showed that
managers with a desire to build empires could overinvest in the market share. While
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increasing the market share increases the sales and ultimately benefits the managers, it
may not benefit the shareholders. Thus, firms that adopt the franchising business
investment model might be overinvesting in the market share by increasing the number of
franchise units in the system. In summary, both underinvestment and overinvestment
problems distort firm value. While the franchising business investment model might be a
solution to reduce underinvestment problem, firms that adopt franchising might
overinvest if managers have a desire to build empires. Accordingly, the following
propositions are offered for testing purposes:
Proposition 4: there is a relationship between investments and firms’ value.
Proposition 5: there is a relationship between firm value and cash holdings.
Proposition 6: under- and overinvestment problems and organizational forms
moderate the relationship between investments and firms’ value.
Proposition 7: under- and overinvestment problems and organizational forms
moderate the relationship between investments and internal funds.
Proposition 8: under- and overinvestment problems and organizational forms
moderate the relationship between firm value and cash holdings.
Furthermore, the hotel industry consists of real estate investment trusts (REITs)
and C-corporation structures. The major difference between Hotel REITs and traditional
corporations is that shareholders of Hotel REITs are exempt from corporate taxation on
distributed dividends. However, to qualify as a REIT, the firm has to meet the criteria
required by the Internal Revenue Code related to asset ownership, income generation, and
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most importantly dividend payouts (Gu & Kim, 2003). That is, REITs must distribute
90% of their taxable income to shareholders every year, which leave them with little
internal funds available to undertake investments, and hence they must seek external
funds for expansion (Beals & Arabia, 1998). Consequently, while the REIT could be
useful to mitigate overinvestment problems, Hotel REITs may face severe
underinvestment problems given that they are required to distribute most of their income.
However, this is ultimately an empirical question. Therefore, I offer the following
propositions to be tested:
Proposition 9: underinvestment problems are higher within the REIT
organizational form relative to C-corporations.
Proposition 10: overinvestment problems are lower within the REIT
organizational form relative to C-corporations.
This dissertation research is based on the underinvestment theory (Myers &
Majluf, 1984) and overinvestment (Jensen, 1986) theory suggesting that financial
condition of the firms influence the investment decisions and the capital scarcity
(Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969) and agency (Rubin, 1978) theories of franchising
suggesting that monitoring cost and lack of financial resources lead hotel firms to
undertake franchising organizational form. The two central hypotheses of the proposed
dissertation research are 1) both underinvestment and overinvestment deteriorate firms’
value; 2) both capital scarcity and monitoring cost lead firms to undertake franchising as
their investment model. While there is extensive empirical evidence showing that
investment decisions depend on the financial condition of the firm under imperfect
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capital market conditions, the extent to which the relationship is due to the degree of
financial constraints or empire building is not well explained (Stein, 2003). Furthermore,
empirical studies that examine the capital scarcity and agency theories of franchising lack
serious methodological problems regarding the identification of capital scarcity of the
firms and monitoring cost proxies. Therefore, identification of the effects of the financial
constraint and exposure to empire building levels can contribute to solve the extent to
which the relationships between investment and firm value and investment and internal
funds are due to underinvestment and overinvestment problems, explain why firms adapt
franchising investment business model, and show the efficacy of Hotel-REITs and
franchising organizational forms on mitigating underinvestment and overinvestment
problems.
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold: (1) to investigate the extent to which
investments affect hotel firms’ value by examining the effects of financial constraints,
corporate governance mechanisms, and organizational forms of franchising and REIT on
acquisitions; (2) to examine the sensitivity of capital and franchising investments to
internal funds; (3) to examine the extent to which franchising, financial constraints, and
corporate governance affect the marginal value of cash in hotel firms.
More specifically, first, the effects of financial constraints and corporate
governance mechanisms on hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are associated with
acquisitions are examined to determine the extent to which investments create value in
some firms and reduce value in others. Second, the abnormal returns associated with
franchising hotel firms’ acquisition announcements are analyzed to determine the extent
to which franchising is due to financial constraints, agency cost, or weak corporate
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governance. Third, abnormal returns associated with hotel-REITs’ acquisition
announcements are investigated to identify whether the REIT is due to financial
constraints, agency cost, or poor corporate governance. Fourth, the relation between
internal funds and hotel firms’ investments are analyzed by classifying firms into
constrained and unconstrained portfolios using financial constraints indices, and
dictatorship and democracy portfolios using corporate governance indices. Also, the
effects of franchising experience and internal funds on the proportion of franchised
divisions are examined to determine why firms adopt franchising investment.
Furthermore, the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is investigated
in order to determine the marginal value of cash holdings in hotel firms. Moreover, the
effects of financial constraints and corporate governance on the relation between
marginal cash holdings and firm value are examined in order to determine the extent to
which asymmetric information or agency problems are more costly for firms. Lastly, the
effect of franchising on the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is
analyzed in order to determine why firms adopt franchising investment.
Accordingly, this dissertation seeks to answer the following research questions.
1) How is firm value affected along the dimensions of financial constraint and
exposure to empire building?
2) Does the REIT organizational form solve the overinvestment problem? Or, does it
increase the underinvestment problem?
3) To what extent financial constraint and exposure to empire building affect
investment-cash flow sensitivity?
4) Why do firms adopt the franchising business investment model?
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5) How is firm value affected along the two lines of franchise and company-owned
unit investments?
The results show that financially constrained hotel firms gain significantly
positive returns, while firms with weak corporate governance experience negative gains
around the acquisition announcements. Acquisitions are positively received when they
indicate underinvestment problems, while they are negatively viewed when they are an
indication of overinvestment problem. The joint effects of financial constraints and
corporate governance show that financial constraints have more effect on firm value than
corporate governance. However, most of the firms seem to have weak corporate
governance mechanisms, suggesting that hotel firms are more exposed to empire building
than financial constraints. Although the majority of the hotel firms have weak corporate
governance mechanism, the investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially
constrained firms than for dictatorship firms. In other words, financially constrained
firms rely more on internal funds than do dictatorship firms, which indicates that the
relationship between internal funds and investment is mostly due to financial constraints.
Similarly, the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained hotel firms
than for unconstrained hotel firms, while it is lower for poorly-governed firms than for
well-governed firms. The coefficient of marginal cash is greater for financially
constrained firms than for poorly-governed firms, suggesting that the asymmetric
information problem is more costly than agency problems. The hotel-REITs and
franchising firms experience negative returns, suggesting that these firms are more likely
to make poorer acquisitions relative to C-corporation counterparts. The results from the
examination of the marginal value of cash holdings in firms that expand through
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franchising indicates that franchising could be utilized as a solution for underinvestment
and agency problems; however, it seems to magnify overinvestment problems in poorlygoverned firms.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
first essay titled “The effects of financial constraints and corporate governance on hotel
firms’ value”. Section 3 presents the second essay titled “The sensitivity of hotel firms’
investment to internal funds: The role of financial constraints and agency problems”.
Section 4 presents the third essay titled “The value of cash holdings in hotel firms: The
role of franchising, financial constraints, and corporate governance”. Section 5
concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON
HOTEL FIRMS’ VALUE
2.1 Introduction
Corporations undertake investments in a variety of forms to expand their business
and create value for stockholders. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which generally
require substantial capital investments, are common investment methods in publicly
traded hotel firms (Canina et al., 2010). M&A allow hotel firms to expand rapidly in both
domestic and foreign markets and the acquisition strategy eliminates the excessive time
for launching a new hotel property from the beginning.
However, an acquisition could be a value-increasing or decreasing project for a
firm. On the one hand, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there is a wedge between the
cost of internal and external funds due to asymmetric information problems, and firms
with growth opportunities might abandon value-increasing projects, which can lead to
underinvestment problems. These firms are considered financially constrained and are
expected to undertake value-increasing investments to reach optimal investment level,
wherein the firm value is maximized. Therefore, financially constrained firms may
expand through M&A to overcome the asymmetric information problems that are
prevalent in capital markets (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2014). Consequently,
shareholders would react positively to the news of a major hotel acquisition.
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The purpose of this study is to examine shareholders’ reactions to news of
acquisitions in the hotel industry. If many hotel firms are financially constrained, then
such news would be positively received. On the other hand, Jensen and Ruback (1983)
show that M&A announcements have on average neutral effects on acquiring firms'
returns. Given that managers often pursue M&A deals despite the lack of obvious value
creation, they conclude that CEOs frequently build empires “by increasing the scope of
firm well beyond a level that maximizes shareholder wealth” (Avery, Chevalier, &
Schaefer, 1998, p. 24). Indeed such M&A strategies may benefit managers more than
they do the shareholders who own the firm. Many external and internal corporate
governance mechanisms have been instituted to prevent management from undertaking
value-decreasing projects (see Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005;
Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). For example, the quality of
internal governance can be increased by a larger fraction of shareholders that are
institutional investors, and the quality of external governances can be improved with
fewer antitakeover provisions (ATPs). This study analyzes stock market reactions to
announcements of acquisitions by hotel firms to determine if overinvestment is a major
problem in this industry.
The organization structure of a hotel firm may affect whether hotel chains are
financially constrained or have governance problems. Many firms in the hotel industry
expand via acquisitions using franchising investment. In this model, franchisors shift the
capital investment risk to the franchisees in exchange for their expertise and brand name.
Alon et al. (2012) show that this strategy works especially well in global hotel
expansions. Unlike other industries, such as manufacturing, service, which is intangible
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and perishable, is the main product in the hotel industry; yet it requires substantial capital
investments to deliver the service. Also, hotel investments depreciate rapidly and often
require expensive refurbishment. Therefore, in addition to difficulties of financing hotel
properties and excessive time required to meet local standards and approvals, such as
zoning, land use, and site development, hotel investments demand periodic capital
expenditures to sustain the service quality. Moreover, strong competition in the global
hotel industry requires an ongoing investment in innovative and advanced technologies to
meet ever-higher quality from hotel guests. These attributes of the hotel industry make
hotel business a capital-intensive industry. Therefore, franchising could be an efficient
investment model for financially constrained hotel firms to meet the increased demands
of their industry (Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969)
Although franchising investments require little or no capital expenditures and they
enable firms to expand rapidly, franchising could make overinvestment easier for empirebuilding CEOs. Jensen (1986) argues that managers of firms with free cash flow tend to
show inept or wasteful investment behavior by overinvesting in rather value-decreasing
projects. In the case of franchising firms, managers might have too much access to
financing, which is generated through franchising and royalty fees, and hence they can
make poor investment choices in acquisitions. Therefore, franchising might be a useful
corporate strategy to control the managerial desire to build empires, if firm is solely
expand through franchising because a new franchised division will not require substantial
capital investment. However, empire-building CEOs of firms that expand through mixed
method (i.e., franchising and capital investments) might intensify overinvestment
problems.
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Another type of organizational structure that could affect financial constraints or
governance problems in the hotel industry is the real estate investment trust (REIT).
Hotel firms might have high cash flows, which could create agency problems if the
managers’ interests are not aligned with those of shareholders. Unlike the C-corporation
structure, hotel-REITs must distribute 90% of their earnings to the shareholders. Hence,
firms with agency problems may adopt the REIT organizational form to legally force
managers to distribute most of firms’ income to shareholders. However, a hotel-REIT
might be constrained from making positive NPV investments because they will be
remained with only 10% of their income. Therefore, while the REIT could be useful to
mitigate overinvestment problems, hotel-REITs may face severe underinvestment
problems given that they are required to distribute most of their income. Nonetheless, this
is ultimately an empirical question, in which the hotel industry provides a unique setting
that allows examination of the effects of under- and overinvestment problems on the firm
value.
Using a sample of acquisitions in the hotel industry, this study investigates the
extent to which investments create value in some firms and reduce value in others by
examining the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms, and
organizational forms of franchising and REIT on hotel firms’ value. More specifically,
the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance mechanisms, franchising, and
REIT on hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition
announcements are examined.
The results show that financially constrained hotel firms gain significantly
positive returns, while firms with weak corporate governance experience negative gains
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around the acquisition announcements. Acquisitions are positively received when they
indicate underinvestment problems, while they are negatively viewed when they are an
indication of overinvestment problem. The joint effects of financial constraints and
corporate governance show that financial constraints have more effect on firm value than
corporate governance. However, most of the firms seem to have weak corporate
governance mechanisms. The hotel-REITs and franchising firms experience negative
returns, suggesting that these firms are more likely to make poorer acquisitions relative to
C-corporation counterparts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature and develops the study hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical approach
of this study. Section 4 presents the results from the analyses of the effects of financial
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms on hotel firms’ value. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that there are informational asymmetries between
firms and outside investors and thus raising capital to undertake investments beyond the
internal funds could be costly. Therefore, firms will bypass the value-increasing project if
internal funds are not sufficient to undertake a positive net present value (NPV) project
because raising external funds increases the project’s cost to a level that makes the
positive NPV project negative (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, firms that face
underinvestment problems due to asymmetric information are considered financially
constrained (Fazzari et al., 1988). In general, financially constrained firms are small and
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young and have greater investment opportunities. Almeida et al. (2004) find that
financially constrained firms keep higher amount of cash to undertake value-increasing
projects because the opportunity cost of internal finance is lower than the opportunity
cost of external finance. Therefore, financially constrained firms are expected to use the
resources to undertake value-increasing projects to reach the optimal investment level
and to maximize the firm value. A marginal investment is expected to create more value
in financially constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009).
Alshwer, Sibilkov, and Zaitats (2011) showed that financially constrained firms are more
likely to use stocks in acquisitions and keep the cash for different investments suggesting
that constrained firms alleviate the asymmetric information faced in capital markets when
acquiring a firm. In other words, constrained firms reduce the wedge between external
and internal finance in acquisitions because informational asymmetries between the
acquiring firms and the target company could be fewer in relation to the capital markets.
Recently however Khatami et al. (2014) show that financially constrained firms gain
more from the acquisitions relative to unconstrained firms regardless of the method of
payment suggesting that constrained firms make better investment decisions because they
have limited funds but higher unexploited investment opportunities. Overall, financially
constrained firms are expected to have positive returns from the acquisitions regardless of
the method of payment because they may successfully manage to exercise investment
opportunities either by internally generating the cash necessary or using stocks, where
they are able to reduce asymmetric information problem faced in capital markets, to
undertake the investment. The following hypotheses are driven based on the
underinvestment theory:
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H1a: There is a positive relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are
associated with acquisition announcements and financial constraint indices, as financial
constraints increase so does the hotel firms’ abnormal returns.
H1b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are higher
for financially constrained firms than for financially unconstrained firms.
Instead of bypassing the positive NPV projects due to financial constraints, the
capital scarcity theory of franchising posits that firms adopt franchising as an alternative
to the company-owned investment (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-1969). That is, firms with
growth prospects expand through franchising in order to fund the growth because they do
not need to allocate substantial capital for expansion through franchising. Oxenfeldt and
Kelly (1968-1969) argue that firms will expand through franchising when they lack
internal resources and ultimately will buy back franchisees and become wholly owned
chains when they mature. Hunt (1973) provides empirical evidence showing that with
increased size and age firms tend to buy back franchised units. Similarly, Caves and
Murphy (1976) show that franchising firms are inclined to grow through wholly owned
hotel establishments with maturity rather than franchising. Hunt (1973) argues that
franchising is very similar to raising stock for expansion in which franchisees are the
source of financial resources rather than stockholders. While studies that empirically
examine the capital scarcity theory assume that all firms that adopt franchising are
financially constrained (see e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987; Combs & David J., 1999), the
degree of financial constraints may vary significantly across firms (Fazzari et al., 1988).
Thus, the franchising investment model could be a solution to reduce underinvestment
problems for financially constrained firms to overcome underinvestment problems

22

(Myers & Majluf, 1984; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-1969). Accordingly, both
underinvestment and capital scarcity theories predict the following hypothesis:
H2a: There is a positive relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are
associated with acquisition announcements and franchising.
H2b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are higher
for financially constrained franchising firms than for unconstrained franchising firms.
Conversely, Rubin (1978) suggests that capital scarcity theory cannot be a good
explanation of franchising. He argues that raising external finance through traditional
channels, such as debt and equity markets, is less costly than franchising because
franchisees will have undiversified investments and hence they will require higher
expected return. He instead posits that firms adopt franchising to overcome the agency
conflicts between divisional managers and the central company in which divisional
managers might shirk from their responsibilities. However, the agency theory predicts
that franchised divisions are not free of agency costs and thus a conflict of interest may
arise between franchised divisions and the firm (Brickley et al., 1991). In general, this
conflict of interest arises from two sources: (1) franchisees’ incentives to free ride on the
trademark by providing low quality service to non-repeat customers and (2) disparities
between divisional managers and the firm related to managerial shirking and
consumption of perquisites (Brickley & Dark, 1987). Although firms can monitor the
divisional managers’ performances, the monitoring cost may be so high that it is
unprofitable. Typically, the cost of monitoring divisional managers is higher than the cost
of franchisees’ free-riding on the trademark when the hotel property is located remotely
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from headquarters of the franchising firms. Therefore, firms will prefer franchising over
company owned divisions when the expansion of the hotel network will take place in
geographic areas that are located far from headquarters (Brickley & Dark, 1987).
However, empirical evidence is mixed with some studies finding support in favor of the
agency theory of franchising (see e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987; Brickley et al., 1991;
Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Roh & Kwag, 1997), while other studies show that both capital
scarcity and agency costs lead firms to adopt franchising (see e.g., Combs & David J.,
1999; Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988). The agency theory of franchising postulates that
the cost of free riding is higher for the divisions that require high levels of investments,
and hence firms will own the division that requires high levels of investment rather than
franchising it (Brickley et al., 1991). This suggests the following hypotheses:
H3a: There is a positive relationship between the relative deal size and franchising hotel
firms’ abnormal returns, as the relative deal size increases so does the franchising hotel
firms’ abnormal returns.
H3b: The franchising hotel firms’ mean abnormal returns that are associated with
acquisition announcements are significantly different from zero.
Franchising may help solve these agency problems, but in the context of hotel
expansion it may exacerbate another. In particular, Jensen (1986) argues that managers of
firms with free cash flows and unused borrowing power are more likely to build empires
by undertaking projects that benefit them but not necessarily the shareholders. Managers
tend to waste the free cash flow by investing in value-decreasing projects, instead of
distributing it to the shareholders, which creates overinvestment problems. Therefore,
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Jensen (1986) suggests that firms should distribute the free cash flow to shareholders and
fund the projects by raising external funds to eliminate overinvestment problems. An
extensive body of empirical literature provides evidence supporting the argument made
by Jensen (1986) that empire building firms experience negative returns from
acquisitions (Chen & Ho, 1997; Doukas, 1995; Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1991). A hotel
investment that requires substantial capital spending could be an overinvestment and
franchising could make these easier for empire-building CEOs.
While early studies used investment opportunities that are measured by Tobin’s Q
(see e.g., Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1989) and the amount of free cash flow (see e.g.,
Doukas, 1995; Lang et al., 1991) to identify empire building firms, recent studies utilize
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Gompers et al. (2003) analyze
the effects of the external governance mechanism on the firm value using an external
governance index that consists of 24 ATPs and find that managers protected by more
ATPs make poorer investments. Increased numbers of ATPs reduce the disciplinary role
of market for corporate control and provide weaker shareholders’ rights, which, in turn,
make it difficult to replace the manager. In other words, more ATPs increase agency cost
between managers and shareholders; hence, managers are more likely to build empires.
Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2006) examine the effects of the external governance
mechanism on the value of firms using an alternative index that only consists of six of the
24 ATPs used by Gompers et al. (2003). They conclude that while this parsimonious
index negatively affects the firm value, the remaining 18 ATPs do not affect the firm
value. The six ATPs are presence of staggered board, limit to shareholders bylaw
amendments, limit to shareholders charter amendments, golden parachutes, supermajority
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requirement to approve a merger, and poison pills. Along the same line, Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005) investigate the presence of staggered board effect on the value of the firm
and find that firms with staggered board of directors have significantly lower firm value.
Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the existence of large investors
increases the quality of internal governance. Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005) and
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) analyze the effect of internal governance mechanism
using the percentage shareholding by institutional investors that are greater than 5% on
the firm value and find that firm value increases with increased amount of institutional
investors. More recently, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show that firms with more
ATPs and/or lower amount of institutional investors make poorer acquisitions suggesting
that poor internal and external governance mechanisms negatively affect firms’ value.
Therefore, managers of firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms are more
likely to make poorer acquisitions and move beyond the optimal investment level relative
to managers of firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms. Accordingly,
overinvestment theory predicts the following hypothesis:
H4a: There is a negative relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are
associated with acquisition announcements and corporate governance indices.
H4b: Firms’ abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are
lower for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed firms.
In addition to corporate governance mechanisms, franchising investment model
might be utilized as a control mechanism to prevent managerial overinvestment of free
cash flows, as franchisor firms allocates little or no capital expenditure for expanding
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through franchising. In other words, franchising could be a way of dealing with
overinvestment problem and hence it might be utilized to supplement the corporate
governance mechanism. Accordingly, franchising firms will be less likely to make
acquisitions because acquisitions will be viewed as overinvestments. However, managers
of firms that adopt franchising might waste company resources by making valuedecreasing acquisitions, if their interests are not aligned with the shareholders. The
following hypotheses are proposed for testing the above predictions:
H5a: There is a negative relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are
associated with acquisition announcements and franchising.
H5b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are lower
for poorly-governed franchising firms than for well-governed franchising firms.
Another organizational structure that is important for the hotel industry is that of
the REIT. The major difference between hotel-REITs and traditional corporations is that
shareholders of hotel-REITs are exempt from corporate taxation on distributed dividends.
However, to qualify as a REIT, the firm has to meet the criteria required by the Internal
Revenue Code (in the case of the US) related to asset ownership, income generation, and
most importantly dividend payouts (Gu & Kim, 2003). That is, REITs must distribute
90% of their taxable income to shareholders every year, which leave them with few
internal funds available to undertake investments, and hence they must seek external
funds for expansion (Beals & Arabia, 1998). Consequently, while the REIT
organizational form could be useful to mitigate overinvestment problems, it could lead to
underinvestment problems. J. Kim and Jang (2012) compare the financial constraint
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levels of Hotel REITs and C-corporation hotels based on Tobin’s Q and show that hotelREITs are more constrained than C-corporation hotels. However, a number of studies
show that measuring financial constraint levels using Tobin’s Q could be misleading
because it is generally imprecise in capturing financial constraints well (Whited & Wu,
2006). Therefore, it is not clear whether the REIT corporate structure mitigates
overinvestment problems or intensifies underinvestment problems relative to Ccorporations. Analyzing whether hotel-REITs’ profitability differs from C-corporation
hotel based on return on assets, Tang and Jang show that hotel-REITs’ and C-corporation
hotels’ profitability do not diverge. H. Kim, Mattila, and Gu (2002) suggest that
expansion through acquisitions may create synergy and increase hotel-REITs’
performances. Nonetheless, it has not been determined whether firms with different
corporate structures perform differently in acquisitions. Therefore, based on the
arguments in the literature regarding corporate structure differences on performance and
under- and overinvestment problems, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H6a: There is a relationship between hotel firms’ abnormal returns that are associated
with acquisition announcements and REIT.
H6b: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are higher
for financially constrained REITs than for unconstrained REITs.
H6c: Abnormal returns that are associated with acquisition announcements are lower for
poorly-governed REITs than for well-governed REITs.
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2.3 Empirical Approach
The observations with missing dependent variables are removed from the analysis
and the observations with missing independent variables are replaced by the firm’s
median values. All the variables are winsorized from 1% and 99% level to remove the
effects of outliers. One sample t-test and Wilcoxon-signed rank test are employed to
analyze whether the CAR mean and median is significantly different from zero.
Independent sample t-test is used to analyze the firms’ CAR mean differences between
constrained and unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy firm portfolios.
Multivariate analyses are conducted utilizing the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
OLS techniques may yield spurious results if the Gauss-Markov assumptions of OLS are
violated. Therefore, the residuals of the model must be diagnosed to determine whether
the estimated coefficients are best linear and unbiased (BLUE) (Gujarati, 2003).
Residuals are diagnosed graphically, skewness and kurtosis values are examined, and
Shapiro Wilk’s test of normality is conducted to test the assumptions of normal
distribution of residuals. Diagnostics revealed that the residuals are not normally
distributed. Bootstrapping technique is used to produce standard errors and probability
values based on normally distributed data. The reported standard errors and probability
values are based on the bootstrapping sample analysis. The residuals are diagnosed for
the presence of heteroscedasticity using White (1980) test. Most of the models’ residuals
appear to suffer from heteroscedasticity problem and hence MacKinnon and White
(1985) adjustment method is used to obtain robust standard errors. The residuals are
further diagnosed to test the presence of autocorrelation utilizing Wooldridge (2002) test.
The data is clustered based on the firms to deal with the autocorrelation and provide
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robust standard errors. Variance Inflation factors are examined for multicollinearity and
all the values in all the models yield acceptable results. Accordingly, the estimated
parameters of the model are BLUE and hence reliable.
3.1 Sample and Data
The data on acquisition announcements are obtained from Thomson Reuters
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Database for the period of 1990-2013.
Initially, 633 announcements are identified that include both hotel-REITs and Ccorporation hotels. However, the following criteria are required for the transactions to be
included in the sample of the study:
1) The acquisition is completed.
2) The deal value is $1 million or higher.
3) The acquiring firm must have financial statement information available from the
Compustat database and company filings from the US Securities and Exchange
Commissions (SEC) EDGAR on the year of the announcement date and stock
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) on the month
of the announcement date.
4) Acquiring firms are US companies that are traded on NYSE, NASDAQ or
AMEX.
The announcements where the acquiring firms have more than one acquisition
within three days of the announcements are excluded. The announcement data from the
SDC Platinum Database are matched with the stock return data from CRSP, financial
statement data from the Compustat, and the corporate governance data from the SEC
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EDGAR. The final sample consists of 178 observations with 21 unique firms over the
period of 1995-2013. The bootstrap method is used to produce standard errors and
probability values based on larger bootstrap samples to deal with problems associated
with small sample size.
2.3.2 Model Specification
The dependent variable is the acquiring firm’s cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR). The independent variables are the organizational forms and financial constraint
and corporate governance indices. Deal and acquiring firm characteristics are used as
control variables.
The dependent variable CAR is measured around the acquisition announcement
dates using standard event study methodology following Brown and Warner (1985). The
announcement dates are obtained from SDC. Daily stock returns, expected returns, and
CAR are analyzed. Daily stock returns are calculated for the 3-day event period (-1, 1)
around the announcement dates as follows.
𝑅!" =

!!"
!!"!!

−1

(1)

where 𝑅!" is the actual return on share i on day t, 𝑃!" is the price for share i on day t, and
𝑃!"!! is the price of share i on day t-1. To estimate the expected return, for each event, we
employed the market model. The market model is a simple OLS regression model. The
parameters are estimated via OLS regression using 200 (-11 to -210) trading day daily
returns prior to the event windows; note that the sample size is 200 for each event. The
model specified as follows.
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𝐸(𝑅!" ) = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝑅!" + 𝑒!"

(2)

where 𝐸(𝑅!" ) is the expected return on share i on day t, 𝑅!" is the market return, which is
the value-weighted return, on day t, 𝑒!" is the random disturbance term, and 𝑎! and 𝛽! are
the market model parameters. For each day of the event window, the abnormal returns are
computed as the difference between actual return and the expected return, which is the
estimated return in the absence of the event, using the following equation:
𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑅!" − 𝐸(𝑅!" )

(3)

where 𝐴𝑅!" is the abnormal return on share i on day t. The dependent variable CAR is
constructed as 3 (-1, 1) day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date,
where zero is the event day, of the acquisitions.
The data for constructing the financial constraint indices is obtained from the
Compustat database based on the firms’ financial statements. The Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) (KZ), the Whited and Wu (2006), and the Size and Age (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010)
financial constraint indices are used as measures of financial constraints. The, KZ, WW,
and SA financial constraint indices are constructed following the methodologies used in
Lamont et al. (2001), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010),
respectively as follows.
𝐾𝑍 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −1.00019×𝐶𝐹 – 39.36×𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 – 1.3×𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 0.282×𝑄 +
3.139×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷

(4)

𝑊𝑊 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0.93– 0.09×𝐶𝐹 – 0.06×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 0.02×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 – 0.04×𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 +
0.1×𝐼𝑆𝐺 – 0.035×𝑆𝐺

(5)
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𝑆𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.737×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 0.043×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ! – 0.040×𝐴𝑔𝑒

(6)

where CF is the cash flow, which is the income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus
depreciation and amortization (item 14) divided by total assets (item 6); TDIV is the total
dividends (item 21+ item 19) divided by total assets (item 6); Cash is the cash and shortterm investments (item 1) divided by total assets (item 6); Q is the Tobin’s Q equals to
total assets (item 6) plus CRSP December Market Equity, which is measured by the
firm’s December closing price on CRSP (item 199) times common shares outstanding
(item 25), minus common equity (item 60) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74)
divided by total assets (item 6); DIVPOS is an indicator that is equal to one if the firm
pays dividends and zero otherwise; TLTD is the total long term debt (item 9) divided by
total assets (item 6); LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets; ISG is the sample
firms’ average sales growth; SG is the firm’s real sales growth; Size is natural logarithm
of total assets; and Age is the number of years the firm has been on Compustat with a
non-missing financial data information. Items are Compustat annual items and they are
lagged 1 year with the exception of item 6, which is lagged 2 years (the constant term,
0.938, in the WW index is obtained from Franzoni (2009)).
A higher score of the indices indicates more financial constraints and hence
higher underinvestment problems. The firms are sorted into two portfolios as constrained
(above median) and unconstrained (below median) based on KZ, WW, and SA financial
constraint index values.
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes 24 ATPs, which
decrease the ability of the investors to replace the manager, for about 2,000 large
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corporations. However, the publications do not comprise the firms in this study sample.
Therefore, the data is hand-collected from firms’ 14-A, S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, and 10K statements, certificate of incorporation, and shareholders’ rights plan on the SEC
EDGAR. The external governance index (BCF Index), which consists of six ATPs, is
constructed following the criteria used in Bebchuk et al. (2006). The six provisions are
the presence of staggered board, limitation on amending corporate bylaws, limitation on
amending the charter, supermajority requirement to approve a merger, golden parachutes,
and poison pill. Basically, the BCF index is the total number of ATPs of firms that takes
the value from one to six, where higher values indicate poor external governance and
hence higher overinvestment problems. Additionally, following Bebchuk et al. (2006),
dictatorship and democracy portfolios are created based on the firms’ number of ATPs, in
which firms with three or more ATPs are included in the dictatorship portfolio, while
firms with two or less ATPs are included in the democracy portfolio. Also, following
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) the presence of staggered board is used as an alternative
governance measure, where the presence of staggered board indicates poor governance.
As a measure of internal governance mechanism, institutional block holdings is
utilized following Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The
block holdings index is constructed as the sum of percentage of shares held by the firm’s
institutional investors that are greater than 5% ownership of the firm’s outstanding
shares. To construct this measure, the data on institutional share holdings is obtained
from the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) Database, which collects
information on institutional shareholdings from the SEC 13-F filings.
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Furthermore, two dummy variables are created to capture the effects of
organizational forms, which are denoted as “franchising”, where firms that adopt the
franchising take the value of one and zero otherwise, and “REIT”, where firms that are
registered as REITs take the value of one and zero otherwise. Also, four interaction
variables that are termed “constrained franchising”, “poorly-governed franchising”,
“constrained REIT”, and “poorly-governed REIT” to measure the differences between
constrained and unconstrained franchising firms, and constrained and unconstrained
REIT firms, poorly-governed and well-governed franchising firms, and poorly-governed
and well-governed REIT firms.
A strand of literature has documented that acquisitions could be either valuecreating or decreasing events for the shareholders of acquirer firms depending on the
acquiring firm’s and target firm’s characteristics and the method of payment (see e.g.,
Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Travlos, 1987). In general,
acquisitions of privately held firms create value for the shareholders, while acquisitions
of publicly traded companies do not create value (Fuller et al., 2002). Furthermore, Heron
and Lie (2002) show that stock-financed acquisitions destroy value, whereas cashfinanced acquisitions have neutral effects on the value of the firms. Travlos (1987)
documents that stock-financed acquisitions of publicly traded companies destroy value,
while those of privately held companies create value. Therefore, to capture the target
ownership status, three dummy variables are created which are termed “public”,
“private”, and “subsidiary”, where they take the value of one if the target is public,
private, and subsidiary firm, respectively, and zero otherwise. Two dummy variables are
created to capture the method of payment effect that are denoted as “all cash”, where
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acquisitions paid by cash take the value of one and zero otherwise, and “combo”, where
acquisitions paid by stocks or a combination of cash and stocks take the value of one and
zero otherwise. The deal characteristics are used as additional control variables.
Specifically, relative deal size, which is the natural log of target size divided by the
acquirer’s market value (item 199 times item 25), method of payment, and target
characteristics are used to control for the deal characteristics. Roll (1986) argues that
larger firms are more likely to make poorer acquisitions and destroy value of the firm.
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find evidence supporting this argument by
showing that large firms experience negative returns from acquisitions. Analyzing the
effects of Tobin’s Q on acquisition returns, Lang et al. (1991) show that Tobin’s Q have a
positive effect on the firm value. Jensen (1986) posits that free cash flow and leverage
indicate the firm’s exposure to empire building suggesting that managers of firms with
high free cash flow and low leverage are likely to destroy shareholders’ wealth in
acquisitions. Following the literature, total assets (item 6), Tobin’s Q, free cash flow (the
ratio of operating income before depreciation [item 13] minus interest expense [item 15]
minus total income taxes [item 16] minus capital expenditures [item 128] to total assets),
and leverage (the ratio of total debt [item 9 + item 34] to total assets [item 6]) are used to
control for acquiring firm characteristics.
The following models are used to estimate the effects of corporate governance,
financial constraints, franchising, and hotel-REIT on the acquiring firms’ returns utilizing
panel OLS regression analysis.
𝐶𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝐼!" +

!
!!! 𝛽! 𝑋!"

+ 𝑒!"

𝐶𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝐼!" + 𝛽! 𝐼!" 𝐹 + 𝐹 +

(7)
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+ 𝑒!"

(8)

𝐶𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝐼!" + 𝛽! 𝐼!" 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 + 𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇 +

!
!!! 𝛽! 𝑋!"

+ 𝑒!"

(9)

where CAR is the acquiring firm i’s cumulative abnormal return at time t, I is either the
corporate governance index of the firm i at time t or financial constraint index, F is the
franchising and REIT is the hotel-REIT dummy variables, X represent a set of control
variables of the firm i at time t that includes the acquiring firm’s total assets, Tobin’s Q,
free cash flow, leverage, and relative deal size and all cash, private, and subsidiary
dummy variables. 𝑒 is the error term and 𝑎! , 𝛽! , and 𝛽! are the models’ parameters.
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
Variables
Total Assets
Free Cash Flow
Tobin’s Q
Leverage
Relative Deal Size
KZ Index
WW Index
SA Index
BCF Index
Staggered Board
Block Holdings
Franchising
REITS

Mean
7.48
-0.06
4.14
0.53
0.15
1.87
0.63
-3.45
4.19
0.72
0.06
0.32
0.54

Median
7.42
-0.01
2.22
0.50
0.03
1.31
0.62
-3.39
4
1
0
0
1

Std. Dev.
1.28
0.14
6.47
0.19
0.31
7.69
0.09
0.38
1.54
0.44
0.10
0.46
0.49

The summary statistics of the independent and control variables are presented in
Table 2.1. Three different financial constraints and corporate governance indices are used
in order to conduct the analyses based on alternative measurements of financial
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms.
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2.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the determinants of acquirer returns. Firms are grouped as
financially constrained and unconstrained and poorly- and well-governed based on the
financial constraints and corporate governance indices. The relationships between
acquirer returns and the financial constraint and governance mechanism are estimated
utilizing the OLS regression analysis to determine the effects of financial constraint and
corporate governance mechanism on hotel firms’ returns.
Table 2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Acquiring Hotel Firms

CAR

Mean
Median

Whole
Sample
0.008b

Franchising
Firms
0.001

Non-Franchising
Firms
0.008c

HotelREITs
0.001

C-Corporation
Hotels
0.016b

0.001

0.006

-0.001

-0.001

0.006

Average
change in
10.58
34.79
-0.82
-9.92
35.15
Dollar Value
(Mil.)
Number of
178
57
121
97
81
obs.
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance (α) levels, respectively based on two tailed
tests.

Table 2.2 displays the CAR of the whole, franchising, non-franchising, hotelREITs, and C-corporation hotel firm samples. The mean CAR is positive in all of the
categories and the C-corporation hotels have the highest returns relative the hotel firms in
other samples. As can be seen from the table the non-franchising hotel firms, on average,
experience higher returns than franchising firms; and the C-corporation hotels have
higher returns than hotel-REITs. Although the returns are only statistically significant for
the non-franchising and C-corporation hotel groups, the dollar value of the returns
underline the economic significance of the losses. Therefore, these preliminarily
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analyses indicate that managers of franchising and hotel-REITs firms make relatively
poorer acquisitions.
Table 2.3 The CAR Mean Differences
Financial Constraint
Criteria
KZ Index
WW Index
SA Index
Corporate Governance
Criteria
BCF Index
Block Holdings

Constrained
(Con)
0.012
0.013
0.102

Unconstrained
(Un)
-0.002
0.006
0.009

Dollar Value (mil.)
Con
Un
17.70
-0.85
6.38
5.78
5.26
-4.37

t-value
-1.72c
-0.78
0.05

Dollar Value (mil.)
Democracy
0.024

Dictatorship
0.002

t-value
2.74a

Democracy
21.71

Dictatorship
6.70

0.012

0.004

-1.24

14.78

6.82

a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively.

The independent sample t-test is conducted to analyze the CAR mean differences
between constrained and unconstrained firms and between the firms in the democracy
and dictatorship portfolios. Table 2.3 presents the results of these tests. The CAR means
differ between constrained and unconstrained firms based on the KZ index of financial
constraints; and between democracy and dictatorship firms based on BCF index of
corporate governance. The differences are statistically and economically significant.
According to the KZ index, firms in the constrained portfolio gain $17.70 million, while
unconstrained firms lose $0.85 million around the acquisition announcements. Similarly,
based on the BCF index, the firms in democracy portfolio gain, on average, $21.71
million, while the firms in dictatorship portfolio gain only $6.7 million around the
acquisition announcements. These results suggest that corporate governance and financial
constraint levels affect value of the hotel firms and that underinvestment appears to
destroy more value than underinvestment. Although the mean differences are not
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statistically significant when differences are measures utilizing other financial constraints
and corporate governance indices, they are economically significant.
To further investigate other possible causes of cumulative abnormal returns,
multivariate analysis are employed. The effects of financial constraint indices on
acquiring hotel firms’ returns are analyzed using the whole sample and the constrained
and unconstrained portfolio of firms, where constrained portfolio includes firms with
financial constraint index score above median score and unconstrained portfolio includes
the firms that have financial constraint index score below median score each year.
Table 2.4 The effects of Financial Constraints on Acquiring Hotel Firms’ Returns
Financial
Constraint
Indices
WW Index

1

2

Whole

Con

Un

0.10a
(2.76)

0.27a
(4.04)

0.09
(1.10)

KZ Index

3

Whole

Con

Un

0.001
(1.16)

0.008c
(1.54)

-0.005
(-0.49)

Number of
obs.
Number of
Bootstrap
obs.
Adjusted R2

Con

Un

0.048
(1.23)
0.16
(1.28)

0.015c
(1.49)
0.064c
(1.67)

-0.05b
(-2.47)

-0.19a
(-3.90)

-0.043
(-0.99)

0.007b
(1.97)

0.007
(1.09)

0.002
(0.83)

0.011
(1.22)
0.046
(1.44)

178

89

89

178

89

89

178

89

89

936

936

936

936

936

936

936

936

936

-0.001

0.002

0.003

-0.001

0.003

0.02

0.002

SA Index
Intercept

Whole

0.042

0.18

CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10%
statistical significance level.

The results from the Table 2.4 show that only the coefficient of WW index is significant
(0.10, p=0.01) using the whole sample and dividing the sample based on the constrained
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and unconstrained firms. The coefficients of financial constraint indices are not
significant for unconstrained firms.
Table 2.5 The effects of Financial Constraints on Acquiring Hotel Firms’ Returns:
Constrained vs. Unconstrained
Financial Constraint
Indices
WW Index

1
Con
0.27a
(3.33)

2
Un
-0.21
(-1.03)

KZ Index

3

Con

Un

-0.01
(-0.70)

-0.001
(-0.36)

SA Index

Con

Un

0.13a
(2.40)

0.004
(0.19)

Control variables
Acquirer Characteristics
Total Assets (Log)

0.001
(0.15)

-0.02
(-1.38)

-0.003
(-0.24)

0.004
(0.44)

-0.001
(-0.80)

-0.01
(-0.75)

Free Cash Flow

-0.003
(-0.09)

0.27
(0.97)

0.09
(1.01)

-0.012
(-0.06)

-0.08c
(-1.79)

0.23
(1.31)

Tobin’s Q

-0.001
(-0.22)

-0.01
(-1.35)

0.008
(0.55)

0.001
(0.21)

-0.001
(-0.29)

-0..01c
(-1.78)

Leverage

-0.009
(-0.42)

0.023
(0.60)

-0.003
(-0.05)

-0.014
(-0.29)

-0.07a
(-2.65)

-0.08
(-1.38)

Relative Deal Size

-0.006
(-0.28)

-0.01
(-0.22)

0.03
(0.59)

-0.011
(-0.28)

-0.01
(-0.80)

0.02
(0.42)

Cash

-0.012
(-0.94)

0.01
(1.57)

0.004
(0.31)

-0.001
(-0.09)

-0.014
(-0.95)

0.01
(1.08)

Private

0.027
(0.81)

-0.09
(-1.51)

-0.016
(-0.28)

0.012
(0.26)

0.07c
(1.90)

-0.03
(-0.93)

Subsidiary

0.01
(0.33)

-0.08
(-1.29)

-0.014
(-0.24)

0.02
(0.41)

0.06c
(1.65)

-0.03
(-0.91)

Intercept

-0.20a
(-2.70)

0.39
(1.52)

0.07
(0.67)

-0.04
(-0.44)

0.40b
(2.36)

0.23a
(2.38)

Target Characteristics

Number of obs.

89
89
89
89
89
89
Number of Bootstrap obs.
936
917
599
654
916
935
Adjusted R2
0.16
0.15
0.22
-0.02
0.21
0.11
CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and
10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests.
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However, conducting the analysis without classifying firms as financially
constrained and unconstrained might be less than perfect. Therefore, following the
methodologies in the previous literature (see e.g., Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), the samples
are sorted into portfolios of constrained and unconstrained firms to better capture the
financial constraint effect on the firm value.
Table 2.6 The effects of Corporate Governance on Acquiring Hotel Firms’ Returns
Corporate
Governance
Indices
BCF Index

1

2

3

4

-0.008b
(-1.73)

Staggered
Board
Block Holdings

-0.008
(-0.63)
0.001
(0.03)

Dictatorship

-0.035b
(-2.22)

Control variables
Acquirer Characteristics
Total Assets
(Log)
Free Cash Flow
Tobin’s Q
Leverage
Deal Characteristics
Relative Deal
Size
Cash
Private
Subsidiary
Intercept
Number of obs.
Number of
Bootstrap obs.
Adjusted R2

0.002
(0.48)
0.033
(0.63)
0.001
(0.16)
-0.002
(-0.10)

-0.003
(-0.97)
-0.007
(-0.16)
0.001
(0.12)
-0.022
(-0.98)

-0.002
(-0.67)
-0.003
(-0.09)
0.001
(0.77)
-0.018
(-0.98)

0.001
(0.22)
0.48
(0.92)
0.001
(0.07)
-0.017
(-0.75)

-0.012
(-0.53)
0.08
(0.88)
0.001
(0.03)
0.04
(0.15)
0.031
(0.68)
178

-0.013
(-0.55)
0.004
(0.49)
0.001
(0.02)
0.004
(0.14)
0.054
(1.12)
178

-0.001
(-0.01)
0.003
(0.41)
-0.004
(-0.14)
-0.004
(-0.14)
0.036
(0.81)
178

-0.017
(-0.81)
0.017
(1.47)
0.003
(0.11)
0.008
(0.30)
0.376
(0.84)
178

936

936

936

936

0.033

0.001

-0.02

0.06

CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10%
statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-sided tests.
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Table 2.5 reports the results of the analysis of financial constraint effects on acquiring
firms’ returns with controlling for acquiring and deal characteristics. The coefficients of
WW and SA indices of financial constraints are positive and significant (0.27, p=0.01
and 0.13, p=0.01, respectively) for the constrained firms’ portfolio, while the coefficient
of KZ index of financial constraints is not significant. These results provide support for
the hypotheses drawn from the underinvestment theory (H1a and H1b) that financially
constrained firms gain significantly higher returns than unconstrained firms, suggesting
that managers of financially constrained firms make better acquisitions than those of
unconstrained firms using their internal resources.
The effects of corporate governance indices on acquiring hotel firms’ returns are
analyzed. Table 2.6 presents the OLS regression analyses of acquiring hotel firms’
returns based on corporate governance indices controlling for acquirer and deal
characteristics. The results from Table 2.6 show that BCF index (continuous variable
form) significantly and negatively affect the cumulative abnormal returns, suggesting that
an addition of one provision decreases the CAR by 0.8%. Similarly, firms in the
dictatorship portfolio have 2.3% lower abnormal returns than firms in the democracy
portfolio utilizing dictatorship (dummy variable form) index of corporate governance.
However, the coefficients of block holdings, staggered board, and the variables that
control for the acquirer and deal characteristics are not statistically significant. Overall,
these results provide support for the overinvestment hypotheses (H4a and H4b) that firms
with poor governance mechanisms experience negative gains from the acquisitions
relative to the firms with better governance mechanisms. These results indicate that
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managers of the firms that are protected by more ATPs make poorer acquisitions in
which managers may receive personal benefits.
Table 2.7 The joint effects of Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance
Financial
Constraint
Indices
WW Index
SA Index

1

2

0.29a (3.02)

0.27a (2.62)

3

4

0.18b (2.28)

0.13c (1.71)

Corporate
Governance
Indices
Dictatorship

-0.04a (-2.81)

BCF Index
Control variables
Acquirer Characteristics

-0.02a (-2.91)

-0.006 (-1.20)

Total Assets
(Log)
-0.001 (-0.12)
Free Cash
Flow
0.033 (0.77)
Tobin’s Q
0.001 (-1.16)
Leverage
0.013 (0.48)
Deal Characteristics
Relative Deal
Size
-0.04b (-2.16)
Cash
-0.015 (-1.35)
Private
0.03c (1.69)
Subsidiary
0.02 (0.95)
Intercept
-0.19c (-1.81)
Number of
89
obs.
Adjusted R2

-0.04a (-3.05)

0.31

0.001 (0.12)

0.01 (0.65)

-0.003 (-0.19)

0.007 (0.16)
-0.001 (-1.01)
0.007 (0.25)

-0.04 (-0.83)
-0.001 (-1.10)
-0.08 (-2.67)

-0.005 (-0.10)
-0.001 (-0.60)
-0.06b (-1.97)

-0.031c (-1.71)
-0.01 (-0.88)
0.017 (1.55)
0.004 (0.14)
-0.19c (-1.68)
89

-0.04c (-1.85)
-0.03b (-2.23)
0.06b (2.14)
0.05c (1.75)
0.60a (3.16)
89

-0.04 (-1.95)
-0.03b (-2.37)
0.04 (1.29)
0.03 (0.98)
0.53a (2.92)
89

0.25

0.30

0.29

CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10%
statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-sided tests.

In order to determine the joint effects of under- and overinvestment problems for
financially constrained firms, effects of financial constraints and corporate governance
mechanisms on acquirer returns are examined. Table 2.7 presents the results of these
analyses. The results from the Table 2.7 show that while the relationship between
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corporate governance indices and the acquirer returns are significantly negative, there is a
positive and statistically significant relationship between financial constraint indices and
acquirer returns.
More specifically, one unit decrease in the quality of corporate governance
decreases firm value by 0.2% and 0.4% based on the BCF index and dictatorship dummy
variable, one unit increase in financial constraints increases firm value by 29% and 18%
based on WW Index and SA Index, respectively. Although financially constrained firms
make value-increasing acquisitions to fund their growth, poor corporate governance
mechanisms have negative effects on returns. However, the degree of financially
constraints has more affect on returns than weak corporate governance mechanisms.
Therefore, these results suggest that financially constrained firms, albeit poorly-governed,
make value-increasing investment choices.
Table 2.8 presents the effects of franchising and REIT organizational forms on
acquiring hotel firms’ returns and reports the differences between constrained and
unconstrained and between poorly- and well-governed franchising and hotel-REITs.
Column 1 shows the returns of franchising and hotel-REITs relative to the returns of
hotels that are registered as C-corporation that do not adopt franchising. Both the
franchising and REIT coefficients are negative and significant, suggesting that
organizational forms of franchising and REITs have lower returns than C-corporation
hotels that do not franchise. The results provide support for the hypothesis (H6a)
postulated for the REIT organizational form; however, they fail to provide support for the
hypothesis (H2a) drawn from the capital scarcity theory of franchising.
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Table 2.8 The effects of Franchising and REIT Forms on Acquisitions’ Returns
Independent
Variables

1

WW Index

2

3

0.21a (2.67)

0.28a (3.58)

BCF Index
a

Franchising
REIT

-0.04 (-3.28)

0.02 (1.48)

-0.05a (-3.56)

Constrained
Franchising
(FranchisingxWW
Index)
Poorly-Governed
Franchising
(FranchisingxBCF
Index)
Constrained REIT
(REITxWW Index)
Poorly-Governed
REIT (REITxBCF
Index)

4

5

-0.01c (-1.83)

-0.01a (-2.85)

-0.02 (-0.48)
-0.10b (2.57)

-0.01 (-1.06)
-0.04b (-1.76)

0.01 (0.16)
-0.03b (-1.97)
0.02b (2.36)

Control Variables
Acquirer
Characteristic
Total Assets (Log)

0.003 (0.80)

0.003 (0.59)

0.01a (2.44)

0.001 (0.36)

-0.01 (-0.25)

Free Cash Flow

-0.04 (-1.31)

-0.007 (-0.16)

0.05 (1.39)

0.01 (0.28)

0.07 (1.64)

Tobin’s Q

0.001 (0.38)

-0.001 (-0.12)

-0.008 (-0.91)

0.001 (0.26)

0.001 (0.26)

Leverage
Deal Characteristic
Relative Deal Size
Cash
Private
Subsidiary
Intercept
Number of obs.

-0.02 (-1.12)

-0.02 (-0.75)

-0.02 (-0.99)

-0.002 (-0.10)

-0.03 (-1.07)

-0.01 (-0.93)
0.008 (0.58)
0.01 (0.58)
0.02 (0.95)
0.03 (0.84)
178

-0.005 (-0.29)
0.02 (1.40)
-0.04 (-0.24)
-0.002 (-0.13)
-0.17b (-1.81)
178

-0.02 (-1.04)
0.03b (1.75)
-0.005 (-0.28)
-0.001 (-0.01)
-0.24a (-2.81)
178

-0.01 (-0.69)
0.005 (0.34)
0.001 (0.03)
0.004 (0.23)
0.04 (1.00)
178

-0.02 (-1.15)
0.02 (1.27)
0.001 (0.01)
0.005 (0.33)
0.08c (1.73)
178

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.03

0.06

Adjusted R2

CAR is the dependent variable. Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10%
statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-sided tests.

Column 2 measures the difference between financially constrained and unconstrained
franchising firms. Although the coefficient of franchising variables loses significance and
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changes sign when the interaction variable is included, the interaction term of constrained
franchising is negative and statistically significant (p<0.05). Therefore, the hypothesis
(H2b) drawn from the capital scarcity theory of franchising is not supported; as these
results indicate that financially constrained franchising firms make poorer acquisitions.
Similarly, column 3 reports the differences between financially constrained and
unconstrained REIT firms. Although the coefficient of WW index is positive, the
coefficients of REIT and the interaction term of constrained REIT are negative and hence
the H6a is not supported, which imply that REIT firms make poorer acquisitions
regardless of the degree of financial constraints. Column 4 analyzes the difference
between poorly- and well-governed franchising firms. Although the coefficient of the
BCF index of corporate governance is negative and statistically significant, coefficients
of franchising and the interaction terms are not statistically significant. Column 5
investigates the difference between poorly- and well-governed hotel-REITs. While
coefficients of BCF index and REIT dummy variables have negative and statistically
significant signs, the coefficient of the interaction term has a positive and statistically
significant sign, which fails to support the hypothesis H6c. In summary, the constrained
REIT firms’ acquisitions are viewed negatively, while poorly-governed REIT firms’
acquisitions are positively received. These results either imply that franchising and REIT
hotels tend to overinvest or the financial constraints and corporate governance indices do
not well capture the constraints and governance measures.
Furthermore, the negative returns of franchising hotels provide support for the
other hypothesis (H3b) of agency theory of franchising that monitoring cost of divisional
managers are higher than the cost of franchisees’ to free ride on the trademark because
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the expansion of the hotel business may take place in geographic areas that are remotely
located from the headquarters. However, the negative coefficients of relative deal size in
all specifications fail to provide support for one of the hypothesis (H3a) drawn from the
agency theory of franchising,
2.5 Conclusions
This study explains why investments that require substantial capital, such as
acquisitions, create value in some hotel firms while they reduce value in other firms. The
hotel industry is chosen to investigate these effects for two reasons. First, building an
additional hotel requires substantial capital investments and time; and hence, hotel firms
commonly use mergers and acquisitions as a corporate strategy to accelerate their
expansions (Canina et al., 2010). Second, contrary to the firms in other industries, such as
manufacturing industries, hotel firms extensively utilize franchising investment, which
require little or no capital investment, to expand their operations. Therefore, hotel
industry provides a unique setting to investigate the effects of under- and overinvestment
problems on the firm value.
On the one hand, financially constrained hotel firms gain significantly higher
returns than unconstrained firms, suggesting that acquisitions could be a way of dealing
with the informational asymmetries for constrained firms; firms with underinvestment
problems move toward the optimal investment level, where the firm value is maximized,
by undertaking an additional investment.
On the other hand, dictatorship firms experience negative gains from the
acquisitions relative to the democracy firms, suggesting that managers of hotel firms that
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are protected by more ATPs destroy value by overinvesting in negative NPV projects and
shift firms away from the optimal investment level.
While both under- and overinvestment problems are problematic for the firm, the
joint examination of the effects of financial constraints and corporate governance
mechanisms on acquirer returns suggests that underinvestment problems are more
destructive for the firm. In other words, underinvestment problems has more effect on
firm value than overinvestment problems, which suggest that weak corporate governance
mechanisms, albeit detrimental, asymmetric information or financial constraints have
more effect on firm value than poor governance mechanisms. However, most of the firms
in this study sample appear to have weak corporate governance mechanisms. That is,
although the degree of financial constraints has relatively more effect on firms’ value,
overinvestment is more common problem than underinvestment in the hotel industry.
Furthermore, shareholders of franchising firms perceive acquisitions negatively,
which suggests that the franchising firms overinvest. Similarly, hotel-REITs’ acquisitions
are viewed negatively, which indicates that these firms face overinvestment problems.
However, the overinvestment problem does not seem to be due to weak corporate
governance mechanisms, but rather these firms are either over-levered or highly
expanded prior to making acquisitions. Also, this study provides partial support for the
agency theory of franchising that the cost of free riding is higher for the divisions that are
remotely located vis-à-vis the headquarters and hence firms should franchise the division
that are remotely located from the headquarters rather than owning it.
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In summary, the results show that investments that move firms toward the optimal
investment level affect firm value more than investments that shift firms beyond the
optimal investment level, relatively. On the one hand, managers of firms with weak
corporate governance mechanisms are likely to make poorer acquisitions by undertaking
value-decreasing investments, which create overinvestment problems and move firms
above the optimal investment level. Therefore, corporations need to institute external and
internal corporate governance mechanisms to control such managerial desire. In
particular, firms with higher ATPs should eliminate provisions and attract more
institutional investors to increase the quality of internal and external corporate
governance mechanisms and refrain from value-decreasing acquisitions. On the other
hand, financially constrained firms are expected to undertake value-increasing
investments by using the internal resources to mitigate informational asymmetries, which
create underinvestment problems and forces firms to operate below the optimal
investment level. Financially constrained firms have limited funds but higher unexploited
investment opportunities; and thus, they undertake value-increasing projects using
internal resources or stocks. Financially constrained firms may be able to reduce the
wedge between external and internal finance in acquisitions, where informational
asymmetries between the acquiring firms and the target company could be fewer in
relation to the capital markets (Alshwer et al., 2011; Khatami et al., 2014). Therefore,
financially constrained firms should undertake investments that require substantial capital
investment through acquisitions, as acquisitions could be a method of reducing
informational asymmetries for those firms. While franchising could be an alternative
method of investment that mitigate under- and/or overinvestment problems, the results
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provide evidence against the general notion in previous studies that examined the theories
of franchising and found that franchising is only due to either capital constraints or
agency costs (see e.g., Combs & David J., 1999; Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988). On the
contrary, franchising firms experience significantly negative gains from acquisitions,
suggesting that franchising could be a tactic for dealing with overinvestment problems.
While financially constrained firms may fund the growth opportunities via franchising
model, franchising firms should take restrictive actions to control managers from making
acquisitions. Although there seems to be additional factors that might explain why
unconstrained firms adopt franchising, postulations of the agency theory of franchising
are partially supported. Hotel-REIT organizational form does not seem to cause
underinvestment problems; however, it does eliminate overinvestment problems, which
suggests that distributing the free cash flow to shareholders may halt managerial desire to
build empires. Hotel-REITs are more likely to make value-increasing investments and
improvement of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in hotel-REITs
could make this corporate structure more efficient than C-corporation hotels.
Although the findings of the study make significant contributions to the corporate
finance, franchising, and hospitality literature, this study is not free from limitations.
While this study reports significant evidence that underinvestment is more depreciating
than overinvestment, the analyses are limited to gains from acquisitions; hence, future
studies may examine the effects of different investments on the firm value. Testing the
underinvestment, overinvestment, and franchising theories using different sample of
industries would substantiate the results of this study. The results from the OLS analysis
that examines the effects of corporate governance on the firm value yield low Adjusted
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R-square values. Although these low values could be seen as a limitation or constraints
due to small sample size, studies in corporate finance literature that examines these issues
reports similar results. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who has developed the internal
corporate governance index using 3,950 observations, report R-square values of 0.02 and
0.04. Therefore, the small numbers are not due to small sample sizes. Rather, these low
values are due to the nature of such studies. Although unobservable effects of firms’
financial policies and investment opportunities might create omitted variable bias, firms’
investment and financial policies and investment opportunities are not disclosed because
of the crucial competition factors that determine a firm’s success. Instead, alternative
proxies are used to capture firms’ policies from information available to the public. Yet,
corporate finance studies may still have low explanatory powers due to the possible
omitted variables. Therefore, future models employing additional explanatory, macro and
firm level, variables might improve the explained variance.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SENSITIVITY OF HOTEL FIRMS’ INVESTMENT TO INTERNAL FUNDS: THE
ROLE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND AGENCY PROBLEMS

3.1 Introduction
The majority of investments in the hotel industry consists of property, which
depreciate in value over time and require maintenance, refurbishment, and renewal to
maintain the level of service demanded by a chain’s customers (Houthakker, 1979; Tsai
& Gu, 2012). Therefore, to expand nationally or globally hotel corporations often must
finance major capital expenditures, such as developing/building and acquisitions of hotels
(Canina et al., 2010), in addition to the financing required to maintain the quality of
existing properties. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms will bypass projects that
require financing beyond internal resources because raising external finance will make
some of the projects unprofitable. Therefore, firms will rely on internal funds (i.e., cash
and cash flow) to undertake capital investments and hence they underinvest. Fazzari et al.
(1988) argue that firms with high degree of investment-cash flow sensitivity are
financially constrained and lack the internal funds for making all positive net present
value investments.
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However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) dispute the interpretation of the
coefficients in the investment-cash flow sensitivity regressions and they argue that the
relationship between internal funds and investments could be due to either financial
constraints or agency problems related to empire building. According to Jensen (1986),
managers of firms with free cash flow may invest beyond the optimal investment level by
undertaking value-decreasing projects to build empires. Although investors and the
capital market may enact internal and external governance mechanisms to control
managers’ actions, these efforts may not fully prevent entrenched managers from
destroying firm value. Thus, a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow in the hotel
industry may instead reflect a problem with managers that overinvest (Lamont, 1997).
This study examines the sensitivity of capital investments to internal funds to
determine the extent to which the relationship between internal funds and investments is
due to financial constraints or to problems with empire building. We consider the
sensitivity of investments to internal funds for financially constrained firms by using the
measures of financial constraints found in Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach (2004),
Hennessy & Whited (2007), Lamont, Polk, & Saa-Requejo (2001) and Whited & Wu
(2006). The sensitivity of investment to internal funds is expected to be higher for poorly
governed firms relative to well-governed firms. We measure the quality of corporate
governance with the number of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs), which are indexed in
Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2006); (Cremers & Nair, 2005; see e.g.,
Gompers et al., 2003), and the existence of major shareholders (Cremers & Nair, 2005;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
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A further consideration that is important for the hotel industry is the ability to
expand the supply of “internal funds” for investment by utilizing the organizational form
of franchising. Franchising reduces the required capital expenditures of the franchising
chain, thus allowing investments that require financing beyond the available internal
funds(Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969). Franchising also enables firms to expand into
foreign markets with bearing little or no capital investment risk, where risk is shifted to
the franchisee in exchange for the franchisor’s expertise and brand name (Alon et al.,
2012)
However, while franchising could be a beneficial strategy for firms to expand
their growth, an alternative view is that it could make overinvestment easier for empirebuilding CEOs. An investment that requires substantial capital spending could create
overinvestment problems in franchising firms, if managers of firms with desires to build
empires use the capital provided by franchisees to undertake investments that are not
beneficial to shareholders and possibly not even to franchisees. A second goal of this
study is to examine the effects of franchising in light of the potential role of internal
funds on investment.
The results show the investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially
constrained firms than for dictatorship firms. However, the majority of the hotel firms
have weak corporate governance mechanisms, suggesting that hotel firms are exposed to
empire building problems more than to foregone investments that arise from financial
constraints. These results suggest that financially constrained firms use mostly internal
resources for investments because of difficulties in raising external finance. Although
dictatorship firms also retain internal funds for investments, managers of dictatorship
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firms tend to use internal resources to undertake value-decreasing projects. Also, firms
utilize franchising to reduce underinvestment and agency problems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature and develops the study hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
methodology of this study. Section 4 presents the results from the analyses of the
sensitivity of capital and franchising investments to internal funds. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
In a world with friction, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that there is a wedge
between external and internal finance, and for some firms this wedge might be so high
that it could make a firm abandon the projects. The main argument is that there is
asymmetric information between firms and outside investors and borrowers that increases
the cost of external finance substantially, especially for issuing equity. Akerlof (1970)
presents a study on the market for lemons that suggests outside, less-informed buyers will
offer a lower price, and sellers with inside information will not accept the less-informed
buyers’ terms. The difference between the buyer and seller prices is due to asymmetric
information between the buyer and seller. In general, the asymmetric information
problem mainly arises from the conflicts of interest between current and prospective
shareholders (Greenwald, Stiglitz, & Weiss, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). More
specifically, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the capital market is imperfect and there
is an adverse selection problem in raising external funds, while internal funds have no
adverse selection problem. This will lead to an underinvestment problem that arises from
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adverse selection, and firms will abandon positive NPV projects that need financing
beyond this point.
Although retaining internal funds could mitigate underinvestment problems, it
may lead to overinvestment problems if managers use the free cash flow to undertake
investments that benefit them but not necessarily the shareholders. According to Jensen
(1986, p. 323) “free cash flow is cash flow in excess of the required funding of projects
that have positive NPV when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.” Managers have
incentive to invest the free cash flow to increase their compensations even if the
investment has negative NPV. Consequently, managers tend to invest more when the firm
has more internal resources instead of distributing them to the shareholders. Similarly,
this also makes the investment sensitive to the available internal funds; that is,
investments increase with the available internal funds. However, in this case, contrary to
the underinvestment theory, firms face overinvestment problems.
In a nutshell, bondholders and shareholders have different incentives, and the
conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders might leave firms in
suboptimal investment level. On the other hand, managers and shareholders might have
different incentives if the manager is not aligned with shareholders, and the conflicts of
interest between managers and shareholders might cause overinvestment problem.
In accordance with the capital market imperfection and asymmetric information
literature, Fazzari et al. (1988) demonstrate that firms with information problems would
rely on internal funds to undertake possible positive NPV investments. Fazzari et al.
(1988) suggest that firms that exhaust all the internal funds available will have greater
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investment-cash flow sensitivity. Because external finance is costly, firms’ investments
will be financially constrained to internal finance, and financially constrained firms will
forgo possible value-increasing projects.
. While some empirical studies provide evidence of investment-cash flow
sensitivity, supporting the underinvestment theory (e.g., Fazzari & Peterson, 1993;
Whited, 1992), others find support for a link between investment-cash flow sensitivity
and the overinvestment theory (e.g., Christie & Nanda, 1994; Devereux & Schiantarelli,
1990).
To overcome the mixed empirical evidence, Vogt (1994) develops an
identification strategy to analyze the link between investment-cash flow sensitivity and
underinvestment and overinvestment theories. Accordingly, in firms with Tobin’s Q
lower than unity, high investment-cash flow sensitivity suggests overinvestment
distortions, while in firms with Tobin’s Q higher than unity, high investment-cash flow
sensitivity suggests underinvestment distortions. Results showed that high investmentcash flow sensitivity could be due to both financial constraints, and hence
underinvestment problems, and exposure to empire building, and hence overinvestment
problems, depending on the firm’s investment opportunities measured by Tobin’s Q.
However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that there is no strong theoretical
reason for investment-cash flow sensitivity to increase monotonically with the degree of
financial constraints, suggesting that sensitivity of investment to internal funds could be
due to the managerial desire to build empires. Furthermore, a number of studies show that
Tobin’s Q is not a reliable measure of financial constraint and/or exposure to empire
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building because it is generally an inaccurate proxy especially for small firms (Whited &
Wu, 2006).
Consequently, alternative measures of financial constraints (see e.g., Almeida et
al., 2004; Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Lamont et al., 2001; Whited & Wu, 2006) and
exposure to empire building (or corporate governance) (see e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2006;
Cremers & Nair, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003) indices have been developed using different
specifications and variables. Consistent with the financial constraint predictions, Almeida
et al. (2004); Whited and Wu (2006); Hennessy and Whited (2007); Denis and Sibilkov
(2009); and Hadlock and Pierce (2010) provide evidence that financially constrained
firms retain greater cash and cash flow than unconstrained firms to overcome
underinvestment problems. Overall, the theoretical framework of the underinvestment
problem described by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that the sensitivity of
investments to internal resources is higher for financially constrained firms than for
unconstrained firms and thus the following hypotheses are offered for testing purposes:
H1: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for constrained firms than for
unconstrained firms.
H1a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for constrained firms than for
unconstrained firms.
H1b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for constrained firms than for
unconstrained firms.
Internal funds might be difficult to measure because there is not a single accounting item
(or variable) for the internal funds. Cash and/or cash flows are used as proxies for internal
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funds in previous studies (see e.g., Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Fazzari et al., 1988) and thus
the main hypothesis is divided into two testable hypotheses.
Although the literature provides substantive evidence on investment sensitivity to
internal funds, as previously pointed out, it is not clear whether the sensitivity of
investment to internal funds is due to financial constraints or managers’ desire to build
empires (Stein, 2003). Using external and internal corporate governance indices
developed by Gompers et al. (2003); Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); and Bebchuk et al.
(2006), and Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), respectively,
Masulis et al. (2007) show that poorly-governed firms (or dictatorship firms) make
poorer investment decisions compared to well-governed firms (or democracy firms).
Therefore, the overinvestment theory suggests that poorly-governed firms rely more on
internal funds to undertake investments than well-governed firms. However, there is no
known study that investigates the sensitivity of investment to internal funds in the context
of overinvestment or the managerial desire to build empires using recently developed
corporate governance indices. Hence, the following hypotheses are drawn from the
overinvestment theory:
H2: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms than for
democracy firms.
H2a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms than for
democracy firms.
H2b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms than for
democracy firms.
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Franchising may help solve these over- and under-investment problems; however,
it could make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. On the one hand,
franchising might be a useful corporate strategy to reduce underinvestment problems
because a new franchised division does not require a substantial capital investment.
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-1969) develop the capital scarcity theory of franchising,
which is analogous to underinvestment theory, suggesting that small and young firms
face capital scarcity and hence these firms may expand through franchising when the
internal funds are not sufficient to undertake company-owned investments. Expansion via
franchising could be a solution to mitigate underinvestment problems, in which firms
might expand through franchising when they lack necessary internal funds. Hence, a
negative relationship between internal funds and proportion of franchised divisions is
expected. Similarly, a positive relationship between capital investments and internal
funds is anticipated. The following hypotheses are developed based on the capital
scarcity theory of franchising:
H3: Internal funds negatively affect proportion of franchised divisions in financially
constrained franchising firms.
H3a: Cash negatively affects the proportion of franchised divisions in financially
constrained franchising firms.
H3b: Cash flow negatively affects the proportion of franchised divisions in
financially constrained franchising firms.
H4: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for constrained franchising firms than
for unconstrained franchising firms.
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H4a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for constrained franchising firms than
for unconstrained franchising firms.
H4b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for constrained franchising firms
than for unconstrained franchising firms.
On the other hand, while franchising can be used as a mechanism to reduce
overinvestment problems, an investment that requires substantial capital spending could
intensify these problems in the context of hotel expansions. Jensen (1986) argues that
managers tend to waste the free cash flow by investing in value-decreasing projects,
instead of distributing it to the shareholders. In particular, managers of franchising firms
might have excess cash, which is generated through franchising and royalty fees, at their
discretion and hence they can make bad investment choices when undertaking a
company-owned hotel investment. While firms could reduce agency problems when
expanding through franchising because franchising does not require a substantial
investment, franchising model could exacerbate overinvestment problems when
expanding via company-owned divisions because managers would have more access to
cash and might waste firms’ resources. The overinvestment theory suggests that poorlygoverned franchising firms rely more on internal funds to undertake capital investments
than well-governed franchising firms. The following hypotheses are generated for testing
purposes:
H5: Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship franchising firms
than for democracy franchising firms.
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H5a: Investment-cash sensitivity is greater for dictatorship franchising firms than
for democracy franchising firms.
H5b: Investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for dictatorship franchising firms
than for democracy franchising firms.
In the case of the agency theory of franchising, Brickley and Dark (1987) posit
that the cost of free riding on the trademark is higher in industries with non-repeat
costumers (non-repeat in terms of one individual division, but not the overall brand), such
as hotels; hence, firms will expand through company-owned divisions, and monitoring
cost increases with increased distance from the headquarters; hence, firms will expand
through franchised divisions. While the former postulation is unrealistic because hotel
firms rely extensively on franchising, the latter postulation is a general fact that hotels
almost exclusively expand via franchising in foreign markets, where the distance is
remote from the headquarters (Graf, 2009). Furthermore, Lafontaine (1992) argues that
franchisors’ experience in developing a franchise system, as measured by the proportion
of franchised divisions in the former year, decreases franchisees’ cost of free riding on
the trademark and hence firms prefer franchising expansion over company-owned
divisions with increased experience in franchising. Therefore, the following hypothesis is
offered for testing purposes:
H6: Franchisors’ experience in franchising positively affects proportion of franchised
divisions.
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3.3 Methodology
The observations with missing dependent variables are removed from the analysis
and the observations with missing independent variables are replaced by the firm’s
median values. All the variables are winsorized from 1% and 99% levels to remove the
effects of outliers. Ordinary least square regression analysis may generate spurious
relationships if the error term is correlated with independent variables. A spurious
relationship may arise due to omission and/or possible endogeneity of independent
variables in the model. In general, the determinants of investments, such as firms’
financial policies and investment opportunities, are not observable and the relation
between investment and internal funds might be endogenously determined (Kaplan &
Zingales, 1997). Although previous studies use Tobin’s Q to account for omitted
investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q could be an inapt proxy in capturing unobservable
investment opportunities (Lamont, 1997). Therefore, the analyses are conducted utilizing
the first-difference Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) panel estimator developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) to account for possible endogeneity problems that may
arise due to the unobservable effects of firms’ financial policies and investment
opportunities and to eliminate firm specific heterogeneity in the model.
The GMM is a dynamic panel data model that produces asymptotically normal,
consistent, and efficient coefficient estimates. While the GMM estimator does not require
the error terms to be normally distributed, the error terms must be free of serial
correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The GMM allows estimation of unknown
population parameters using the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor and
the available sample’s moment conditions, where the difference between sample values
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of dependent variable and expected values of population parameters approximates to
zero. Furthermore, lagged independent variables are used as instrumental variables to
account for the effects of omitted variables and endogeneity problems in GMM (Blundell
& Bond, 1998).
3.3.1 Sample and Data
The sample of this study consists of public hotel companies in the United States
(US) that have financial data available on the COMPUSTAT annual database and
company filings on the US Securities and Exchange Commissions (SEC) EDGAR at any
time over the period of 1993-2013. The beginning of the sample period is limited to the
year 1993 because company filings are only available from the beginning of 1993 at
SEC. The final sample consists of 312 firm-year observations with 41 unique firms. The
dependent variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual database and SEC
EDGAR. The data for constructing the financial constraint indices and independent and
control variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual database. The Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes the 24 antitakeover provisions (ATP),
which decrease the ability of the investors to replace the manager, for about 2,000 large
corporations. However, the publications do not comprise the firms in this study sample.
Therefore, the data for constructing external governance proxies are hand-collected from
firms’ 14-A, S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, and 10-K statements, certificate of incorporation,
and the shareholders’ rights plan that are available on the SEC EDGAR. The institutional
block holdings data, which is used as a proxy for constructing the internal governance
proxy, is obtained from Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) Database.
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3.3.2 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of dependent, independent, and grouping variables are
presented in Table 3.1 along with the correlation matrix of these variables. Three
different measures of financial constraints and corporate governance indices are used to
test the extent to which these indices capture the same information in terms of financial
constraints and exposure to empire building of firms in this study sample.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Invest
ment

Cash

Cash
Flow

KZ
Index

WW
Index

Cleary
Index

BCF
Index

Staggered
Board

Investment
0.10
0.16
1
(Mil.)
Cash (Mil.)
0.07
0.09
0.30a
1
Cash Flow
0.06
0.07
0.04
0.09c
1
(Mil.)
KZ Index
-67.49 93.01
0.02
-0.07 -0.72a
1
WW Index
1.90
6.03
-0.04
-0.05
0.04
-0.04
1
Cleary
a
-0.37
4.11
0.06
-0.03
0.01
-0.18
0.01
1
Index
a
BCF Index
3.58
1.82
-0.07 -0.13
-0.03
0.00
0.07
0.11b
1
Staggered
0.69
0.45
0.01
-0.02
0.11b -0.08c -0.03
0.06
0.30a
1
Board
Block
0.08
0.14
-0.06
-0.03
0.02
-0.01 -0.06
-0.05
0.03
0.07
Holdings
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-sided tests.

According to the correlation analysis results, investment is positively correlated
with cash and cash flow, but the correlation between investment and cash is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. While three of the financial constraints
indices are negatively correlated with cash, none of the correlation coefficients are
statistically significant. Similarly, three of the corporate governance indices are
negatively correlated with cash, but the correlation coefficient is only statistically
significant for the relation between cash and the BCF index. The cash flow is correlated
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positively with the WW and the Cleary indices and negatively with the KZ index.
However, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation
between cash flow and the KZ index. Although cash flow is correlated positively with the
staggered board and block holdings and negatively with the BCF index, the correlation
coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation between cash flow and the BCF
index.
Furthermore, the KZ index is negatively correlated with the WW index and the
Cleary index; however, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the
relation between the KZ index and the Cleary index. Although the sign of the correlation
coefficient between the WW index and the Cleary index is positive, it is not statistically
significant. The corporate governance indices are all positively correlated with each
other. However, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation
between the BCF index and the staggered board. These results suggest that different
financial constraints and corporate governance indices capture different information in
regards to firms’ financial constraint levels and the quality of corporate governance
mechanisms. Therefore, the use of different index measures is necessary to capture more
information about firms’ degrees of financial constraints and exposure to empire
building.
3.3.3 Model Specification
The dependent variables are the investment as measured by capital expenditures
(item 128) and the proportion of franchised divisions as measured by the number of
franchised divisions over the total number of franchised and company-owned divisions.
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The independent variables are cash, which is measured by cash and short-term
investments (item 1), and cash flow as measured by the income before extraordinary
items (item 18) plus depreciation and amortization (item 14). Tobin’s Q might have
positive or negative effects on investment depending on the firms’ degree of financial
constraints and exposure to empire building (Fazzari et al., 1988; Vogt, 1997). Jensen
(1986) suggests that leverage reveals the firm’s exposure to empire building in which
managers of firms with low leverage and exposure to empire building are likely to
depreciate firms’ value. Following the literature, size as measured by total assets (item 6);
Tobin’s Q as measured by total assets (item 6) plus CRSP December Market Equity,
which is measured by the firm’s December closing price on CRSP (item 199) times
common shares outstanding (item 25), minus common equity (item 60) minus balance
sheet deferred taxes (item 74); and leverage (the ratio of total debt [item 9 + item 34] to
total assets [item 6]) are used to control for firms’ characteristics. Dependent,
independent, and control variables are adjusted by total book assets (item 6) with the
exception of the proportion of franchised divisions. Financial constraint and corporate
governance indices are used as grouping variables to sort firms as constrained and
unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the degree of financial
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms, respectively.
The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, the Whited and Wu (2006) index, and the
Cleary index (Hennessy & Whited, 2007) are utilized to sort the firms as constrained and
unconstrained based on firms’ financial constraint levels. The, KZ, WW, and Cleary
financial constraint indices are constructed following the methodologies used in Lamont
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et al. (2001), Whited and Wu (2006), and Hennessy and Whited (2007), respectively as
follows.
𝐾𝑍 = −1.00019×𝐶𝐹 – 39.36×𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 – 1.3×𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 0.282×𝑄 + 3.139×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 (1)
𝑊𝑊 = 0.93– 0.09×𝐶𝐹 – 0.06×𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑂𝑆 + 0.02×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 – 0.04×𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴 + 0.1×
𝐼𝑆𝐺 – 0.035×𝑆𝐺

(2)

𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 = −0.12×𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇 − 1.90×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 + 0.001×𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 + 1.46×𝐼𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺 +
2.03×𝑆𝐺 − 0.05×𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾

(3)

where CF is the cash flow, which is the income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus
depreciation and amortization (item 14) divided by total assets (item 6); TDIV is the total
dividends (item 21+ item 19) divided by total assets (item 6); Cash is the cash and shortterm investments (item 1) divided by total assets (item 6); Q is the Tobin’s Q; DIVPOS is
an indicator that is equal to one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise; TLTD is
the total long term debt (item 9) divided by total assets (item 6); LNTA is the natural
logarithm of total assets; ISG is the sample firms’ average sales growth; SG is the firm’s
real sales growth; CURAT is the current assets (item 4) divided by current liabilities (item
5); COVER is the interest coverage and measured as earning before interest and taxes
(item 3 minus item 14) over interest expense (item 15) plus preferred dividend payments
(item 19) divided by one minus tax rate, where tax rate equals to income taxes (item 16)
divided by operating income before depreciation (item 13) minus depreciation and
amortization (item 14) minus interest expense (item 15); IMARG is the net income (item
18) divided by sales (item 12); and SLACK is the financial slack measured as cash and
short-term investments (item 1) plus 0.5 times inventory (item 3) plus 0.7 times accounts
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receivable (item 2) minus short term loans (item 196) divided by net fixed assets (item 8).
Items are Compustat annual items and the constant term, 0.93, in the WW index is
obtained from Franzoni (2009). A higher score of the indices indicates more financial
constraints and hence higher underinvestment problems. The firms are sorted into two
portfolios as constrained (upper tercile; i.e., firms that have upper 33% of index values)
and unconstrained (bottom tercile) based on KZ, WW, and Cleary financial constraint
index values.
Three different corporate governance indices are utilized to identify firms’
quality of governance mechanisms. Gompers et al. (2003) analyze the effects of the
external governance mechanism on firm value using an external governance index that
consists of 24 ATPs and find that managers protected by more ATPs make poorer
investments. Increased numbers of ATPs reduce the disciplinary role of market for
corporate control and provide weaker shareholders’ rights, which, in turn, make it
difficult to replace the manager. In other words, more ATPs increase agency cost
between managers and shareholders; hence, managers are more likely to build empires.
Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2006) examine the effects of the external governance
mechanism on the value of firms using an alternative index that only consists of six of the
24 ATPs used by Gompers et al. (2003). They conclude that while this parsimonious
index negatively affects the firm value, the remaining 18 ATPs do not affect the firm
value. The six ATPs are presence of a staggered board, limit to shareholders bylaw
amendments, limit to shareholders charter amendments, golden parachutes, supermajority
requirement to approve a merger, and poison pills. Along the same line, Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005) investigate the presence of a staggered board effect on the value of the firm
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and find that firms with a staggered board of directors have significantly lower firm
value. Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the existence of large investors
increases the quality of internal governance. Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005) and
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) analyze the effect of internal governance mechanism
using the percentage shareholding by institutional investors that are greater than 5% on
the firm value and find that firm value increases with increased amount of institutional
investors. The external governance index (BCF Index), which consists of six ATPs, is
constructed following the criteria used in Bebchuk et al. (2006). The six provisions are
the presence of a staggered board, limitation on amending corporate bylaws, limitation on
amending the charter, supermajority requirement to approve a merger, golden parachutes,
and poison pill. Basically, the BCF index is the total number of firms’ ATPs that takes
the value from one to six, where higher values indicate poor external governance and
hence higher overinvestment problems. Following Bebchuk et al. (2006), firms are sorted
into dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the firms’ number of ATPs, where
firms with three or more ATPs are included in the dictatorship portfolio, while firms with
two or less ATPs are included in the democracy portfolio. Also, following Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005), firms are sorted into dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the
presence of a staggered board, where firms with a staggered board are included in the
dictatorship portfolio, while firms without a staggered board are included in the
democracy portfolio. As a measure of internal governance mechanism, institutional block
holdings is utilized following Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith
(2007). Similarly, firms are sorted into dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on
the firms’ amount of institutional investors, where firms that have institutional ownership
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5% or less of the firm’s outstanding shares are included in the dictatorship portfolio,
while firms that have institutional ownership greater than 5% of the firm’s outstanding
shares are included in the democracy portfolio.
The following model is used to analyze the sensitivity of investment to internal
funds in constrained and unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy firms’ portfolios:
𝐼!"!! = 𝛽! 𝐼!" + 𝛽! 𝐶!" + 𝛽! 𝐶𝐹!" + 𝛽! 𝑋!" + 𝑒!"

(4)

and the following model is used to examine the determinants of franchising investments:
𝐹𝐷!" = 𝛽! 𝐹𝐷!"!! + 𝛽! 𝐶!" + 𝛽! 𝐶𝐹!" + 𝛽! 𝑋!" + 𝑒!"

(5)

where I is the firm i’s capital expenditure at time t and t+1, FD is the firm i’s proportion
of franchised divisions at time t and t-1, C is the firm i’s cash and short term investments
at time t, CF is the firm i’s cash flow at time t, X represents a set of control variables of
the firm i at time t that includes the firm’s leverage, Tobin’s Q, and size. 𝑒 is the error
term and 𝛽! , 𝛽! , 𝛽! and 𝛽! are the models’ parameters.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the summary statistics and the results of multivariate
analyses that examine the extent to which sensitivity of investment to internal funds
varies between constrained and unconstrained; and between dictatorship and democracy
firms. The multivariate analyses are conducted utilizing first-difference GMM to account
for the possible endogeneity problem between investment and internal funds; that is, the
lagged dependent variable is added as an additional explanatory variable and lagged
independent variables are used as instrumental variables.
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Table 3.2 presents the effects of internal funds on investment without classifying
firms based on the financial constraints or corporate governance indices. Column 1, 2,
and 3 analyze the sensitivity of investment to cash, cash flow, and cash and cash flow,
respectively.
Table 3.2 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments
Independent Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Investmentt
0.29a (3.30)
0.33a (3.83)
0.25a (2.96)
Casht
0.30a (3.00)
0.30a (2.99)
Cash Flowt
0.21 (1.42)
0.14 (0.97)
Leveraget
0.13b (2.52)
0.08 (1.62)
0.12b (0.98)
Tobin’s Qt
-0.01 (-0.76)
-0.01 (-0.62)
-0.01 (-0.37)
Sizet
-0.11a (8.97)
-0.12a (-9.11)
-0.11a (-8.84)
Wald Test
301.01a
282.56a
307.84a
Sargan Test
132.86
147.56
147.47
AR(1) z-stat.
-5.17a
-5.10a
-5.21a
AR(2) z-stat.
-0.29
-0.05
-0.13
Number of Obs.
312
312
312
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are
in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based
on two-tailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term
tests of first and second order serial correlations, respectively.

The coefficient of cash in column 1 is positive and statistically significant. The
coefficient of cash flow in column 2 is also positive but it is statistically insignificant.
Column 3 reports the results of simultaneous inclusion of cash and cash flow variables.
The analysis yields results similar to those in Column 1 and 2. These preliminary results
provide support for the relationship between investments and internal funds. However, in
order to determine the extent to which the sensitivity of investment is due to financial
constraints and/or exposure to empire building further analyses are conducted sorting
firms into constrained/unconstrained and democracy/dictatorship portfolios.
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Table 3.3 presents the effects of internal funds on investment for the constrained
and unconstrained firm portfolios. The firms are sorted into constrained and
unconstrained portfolios based on the KZ, WW, and Cleary indices.
Table 3.3 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments: Constrained vs.
Unconstrained Firms
Financial Constraint
Criteria

KZ Index

WW Index
Cleary Index
Constrained Firms
Investmentt
-0.15 (-0.11)
0.41a (3.32)
-0.47b (-2.42)
a
a
Casht
0.50 (3.55)
0.52 (3.08)
0.52a (3.38)
b
Cash Flowt
0.43 (2.27)
-0.08 (0.28)
0.72a (2.80)
c
Leveraget
0.14 (1.79)
0.07 (0.98)
0.22a (2.79)
Tobin’s Qt
0.01 (0.57)
-0.01 (-1.42)
0.03a (3.40)
a
a
Sizet
-0.11 (6.05)
-0.07 (-2.83)
-0.13a (-6.52)
a
a
Wald Test
165.20
74.77
205.65a
Sargan Test
93.07
59.00
50.33
AR(1) z-stat.
-2.03b
-1.55
-1.66
AR(2) z-stat.
0.50
-0.60
0.76
Number of Obs.
102
103
99
Unconstrained Firms
Investmentt
-0.10 (-0.48)
-0.32a (-3.55)
0.41a (3.41)
a
Casht
-0.13 (-0.75)
0.38 (3.09)
0.27c (1.66)
Cash Flowt
0.41 (1.47)
0.06 (0.34)
-0.44 (-1.56)
Leveraget
0.10 (1.05)
0.12 (1.30)
0.18 (1.46)
Tobin’s Qt
0.11c (1.74)
0.02a (3.67)
-0.01 (-0.18)
Sizet
-0.16a (-4.65)
-0.11a (-3.06)
-0.17a (-3.88)
a
a
Wald Test
130.94
172.37
115.18a
Sargan Test
39.00
96.01
44.36
AR (1) z-stat.
-1.01
-0.40
-1.58
AR (2) z-stat.
-2.29b
-0.20
-0.01
Number of Obs.
111
106
115
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are in
parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on twotailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of first
and second order serial correlations, respectively.

Prior to interpreting the coefficient estimates, overall significance of the model, validity
of instruments, and the presence of serial correlation in the error terms must be
investigated. Wald statistic, which is a test of the joint significance of the coefficient
estimates, shows that the coefficients are jointly significant. The Sargan test of over-
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identifying restrictions is employed to examine the validity of the instrumental variables
as recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998). The Sargan test statistic has the null
hypothesis of instrumental validity. The results suggest that the variables used to account
for possible endogeneity problems are valid instruments. Also, the first, AR(1), and
second order, AR(2), serial correlation tests, which have the null hypotheses of no serial
correlations, are used following Arellano and Bond (1991). According to the results, the
error terms have no serial correlations and thus it can be proceed with the interpretation
of coefficient estimates. The results show that the sensitivity of investment to cash is
positive and significant for constrained firms’ portfolio based on three of the financial
constraint indices, and the coefficients are greater relative to the sensitivity of investment
to cash in unconstrained firms’ portfolio. Specifically, the sensitivity of investment to
cash is 0.50 (p<0.01), 0.52 (p<0.01), and 0.52 (p<0.01) for constrained firms, while it is 0.13, 0.38 (p<0.01), and 0.27 (p<0.1) for unconstrained firms based on the KZ, WW, and
Cleary indices. The investment-cash flow sensitivity is also greater for constrained firms
than for unconstrained firms based on the KZ and Cleary indices, and the relationship is
positive and significant for constrained firms. Although the investment-cash flow
sensitivity is smaller for constrained firms’ portfolio than for unconstrained firms’
portfolio, it is not significant for either of the portfolios based on the WW index. Overall,
the results support the hypotheses (H1: H1a and H1b) drawn from the underinvestment
theory that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is greater for constrained firms
than for unconstrained firms, suggesting that there is wedge between internal and external
finances and hence financially constrained firms rely on internal funds to undertake
value-increasing projects.
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Table 3.4 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments: Dictatorship vs.
Democracy Firms
Governance Criteria

BCF Index

Staggered Board
Block Holdings
Dictatorship Firms
Investmentt
0.33a (3.78)
0.30a (3.36)
0.30a (3.16)
b
Casht
0.40 (2.57)
0.14 (1.21)
0.50a (3.38)
Cash Flowt
-0.19 (-0.97)
-0.01 (-0.05)
0.23 (1.14)
Leveraget
0.15a (2.64)
0.10 (1.64)
0.14c (1.68)
Tobin’s Qt
-0.01 (-1.23)
-0.01 (-0.49)
-0.01 (-0.23)
Sizet
-0.10a (-7.07)
-0.13a (7.56)
-0.12a (-7.68)
Wald Test
224.60a
271.76a
165.96a
Sargan Test
129.53
94.76
108.17
AR(1) z-stat.
-5.24a
-4.00a
-3.78a
AR(2) z-stat.
0.56
0.65
-0.66
Number of Obs.
203
220
187
Democracy Firms
Investmentt
-0.23 (-1.29)
-0.32c (-1.96)
-0.03 (-0.28)
Casht
0.13 (1.02)
0.47b (2.31)
0.06 (0.51)
Cash Flowt
0.64a (2.77)
0.28 (1.24)
-0.10 (-0.60)
Leveraget
-0.07 (-0.69)
-0.08 (-0.67)
0.01 (0.09)
Tobin’s Qt
0.01b (2.47)
0.02a (2.89)
0.01 (1.16)
Sizet
-0.10a (-3.76)
-0.10a (-5.64)
-0.12a (-4.18)
Wald Test
105.07a
96.63a
318.38a
Sargan Test
62.95
75.22
60.81
AR(1) z-stat.
-3.05a
-4.23a
-1.87c
AR(2) z-stat.
-1.44
-0.25
0.68
Number of Obs.
109
92
125
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are in
parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on twotailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of first
and second order serial correlations, respectively.

Table 3.4 illustrates the effects of internal funds on investment for the dictatorship
and democracy firms’ portfolios. The firms are sorted into dictatorship and democracy
portfolios based on the BCF index, the presence of a staggered board, and the amount of
block holdings. Wald statistics show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each
model. The Sargan test, which is used to test over-identifying restrictions, statistics
suggest that the instruments are valid for all the models. The statistics from the first,
AR(1), and second order, AR(2), serial correlation tests show that the error terms have no
serial correlations. The results show that the sensitivity of investment to cash is positive
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and significant for dictatorship firms’ portfolio based on the BCF index and the block
holdings criteria, and the coefficients are greater relative to the sensitivity of investment
to cash in democracy firms’ portfolio. Particularly, the investment-cash sensitivity is 0.40
(p<0.05) and 0.50 (p<0.01) for dictatorship firms, while it is 0.13 and 0.06 for democracy
firms based on the BCF index and the block holdings classifications. The investmentcash flow sensitivity, which is positive and statistically significant, is greater in
democracy firms’ portfolio compared to dictatorship firms’ portfolio based on the BCF
index criterion. Accordingly, firms that have less than five percent institutional investors
rely more on internal funds than firms that have more than five percent institutional
investors. In the same vein, investment-cash sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms,
in which managers of firms are protected by more ATPs, than for democracy firms.
However, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is not significant for dictatorship firms
based on any of the corporate governance classifications. More interestingly, although the
sensitivity of investment to cash is positive for dictatorship firms’ portfolio based on the
presence of a staggered board criterion, it is not statistically significant and it is smaller
than the investment-cash sensitivity in democracy firms, which may indicate that the
presence of a staggered board may not be a good proxy for exposure to empire building.
Overall, the results support the first hypothesis (H2: H2a) drawn from the overinvestment
theory that the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is greater for dictatorship firms
than for democracy firms.
Table 3.5 depicts the determinants of franchising investment for all, constrained,
and unconstrained franchising firm samples. The firms are classified into financially
constrained and unconstrained franchising firms based on the WW index. Wald statistics
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show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions statistics suggests that the instruments are valid for all the models.
The statistics from the first, AR(1), and second order, AR(2), serial correlation tests show
that the error terms have no serial correlations. The results show that the relation between
internal funds (cash and cash flow) and franchising investment is negative for all,
constrained, and unconstrained franchising firm sample analyses. While the coefficients
of cash and cash flow are not statistically significant for the analyses of all and
unconstrained franchising firm samples, the coefficient of cash flow is statistically
significant for the constrained franchising firm sample analysis. Therefore, the results
partially support the hypotheses (H3a) drawn from the capital scarcity theory of
franchising and underinvestment theory, which suggests that financially constrained firms
expand through franchising to mitigate underinvestment problems.
Table 3.5 Determinants of Franchising Investments
All Franchising Firms
Constrained Firms
Unconstrained Firms
Franchised Divisionst-1
0.29c (1.52)
0.41b (1.79)
0.31b (2.18)
Casht
-0.17 (-0.28)
-0.59 (-0.65)
-0.54c (-1.48)
b
Cash Flowt
-0.87 (-1.06)
-2.97 (-2.01)
-0.42 (-0.52)
Leveraget
-0.55b (-2.29)
-0.93b (-1.92)
-0.43b (-2.02)
Tobin’s Qt
0.07a (3.55)
0.27a (4.04)
0.01 (0.48)
Sizet
-0.03 (-0.34)
-0.32b (-1.90)
0.30a (3.94)
Wald Test
30.08a
24.16a
132.00a
Sargan Test
43.73
28.63
41.83
AR(1) z-stat.
-1.25
-1.26
-0.87
AR(2) z-stat.
0.11
-0.47
0.66
Number of Obs.
65
34
31
Franchising Divisions is the dependent variable as measured by the number of franchised divisions
over number of franchised and owned divisions at year t. Z-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, and c
indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on one-tailed tests. All models
control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of first and second order serial
correlations, respectively.

The coefficients of lagged dependent variable in Table 5, which signifies
proportion of franchised divisions in year t-1, are positive for all, constrained, and
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unconstrained franchising firm sample analyses. Therefore, the results support the
hypothesis (H6) drawn from the agency theory of franchising that firms expand through
franchising with increased experience in developing a franchise system, suggesting that
firms may expand through franchising to eliminate the agency costs of divisional
managers.
The sensitivity of investment to internal funds is further investigated to determine
if the sensitivity is greater in constrained/unconstrained and dictatorship/democracy
franchising firms’ portfolios. Table 3.6 presents the results of these analyses. The results
show that constrained franchising firms rely more on cash than unconstrained franchising
firms. However, the coefficients of cash flow are statistically insignificant for both
constrained and unconstrained franchising firms’ portfolios.
Table 3.6 The effects of Internal Funds on Capital Investments: Franchising
Firms
Financial
Constraints/Corporate
Constrained
Unconstrained
Governance Criteria
Firms
Firms
Dictatorship
Democracy
Investmentt
0.32a (2.58)
0.22b (2.44)
0.25a (4.03)
-2.38b (-2.04)
Casht
0.34c (1.80)
-0.27 (-0.91)
0.18 (0.92)
-0.19 (-0.48)
Cash Flowt
-0.10 (-0.53)
0.48 (0.79)
0.13 (0.43)
1.94c (1.93)
b
Leveraget
0.07 (1.33)
-0.04 (-0.58)
0.12 (0.98)
-5.45b (-2.07)
a
Tobin’s Qt
-0.02 (-2.28)
0.01 (0.45)
-0.05 (-2.63)
-0.16b (-2.48)
a
Sizet
0.01 (0.23)
0.08 (0.91)
-0.11 (-8.84)
2.15b (2.27)
a
a
a
Wald Test
163.52
89.69
180.91
222.31a
a
a
b
Sargan Test
40.64
33.28
40.79
17.46a
a
a
a
AR(1) z-stat.
-2.86
-2.67
-2.64
-1.81c
AR(2) z-stat.
-1.25
1.28
-0.02
-2.51b
Number of Obs.
45
39
46
38
Investment is the dependent variable as measured by capital expenditure at year t+1. Z-statistics are in
parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on
two-tailed tests. All models control for year fixed effects. AR (1) and AR (2) are the error term tests of
first and second order serial correlations, respectively.

These results support the one hypothesis (H4a), while they fail to support the other
hypothesis (H4b) drawn from the capital scarcity theory. The coefficient of cash on
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dictatorship firms’ portfolio suggests that poorly governed firms rely more on cash than
well-governed firms; however, the result is statistically insignificant. The coefficient of
cash flow is also insignificant for dictatorship firms’ portfolio and it is smaller than the
coefficient of cash flow in democracy firms’ portfolio. These results could be due to
either small sample size or that the corporate governance index does not measure the
overinvestment problems well.
3.5 Conclusions
While both underinvestment and overinvestment theories suggest that the
availability of internal funds increases investments (Fazzari et al., 1988; Jensen, 1986;
Myers & Majluf, 1984), it is less well understood the extent to which the investmentinternal funds sensitivity differs between firms with underinvestment problems and firms
with overinvestment problems. This study investigates the role of internal funds on
capital investments in the hospitality industry based on the firms’ degree of financial
constraints and exposure to empire building. Firms are classified into constrained and
unconstrained portfolios using the KZ, WW, and Cleary financial constraint indices and
the results show that financially constrained firms rely more on internal funds than do
unconstrained firms. This finding suggests that financially constrained hotel chains
accumulate internally generated funds to undertake value-increasing projects.
Firms are further categorized as dictatorship and democracy portfolios using the
BCF index, the presence of a staggered board, and the amount of institutional
shareholders in order to determine the extent to which the sensitivity of investment to
internal funds varies between dictatorship and democracy firms. The results indicate that
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investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms, which are likely
overinvesting due to empire building managers. The results substantiate the
overinvestment theory propositions of Jensen (1986) and indicate that shareholder value
is more likely to be maximized in democratic hotel firms.
The determinants of franchising investments are analyzed to examine the
predictions of the agency and capital scarcity theories. The results show that the
relationship between the proportion of franchised units and internal funds is not
significant when the analysis is conducted by pooling all the firms that adopt franchising
in a single sample. However, this relationship might be different for financially
constrained and unconstrained firms, this study resolves the methodological flaw that
exists in previous empirical studies testing the capital scarcity theory of franchising
regarding the identification of firms’ financial constraint levels. Using financial
constraint indices, firms that adopt franchising are further sorted into financially
constrained and unconstrained categories in order to compare the extent to which
constrained and unconstrained firms depend on internal funds to undertake franchising
investments. The relation between proportion of franchised units and cash flow is
negative for financially constrained firms, suggesting that financially constrained firms
expand through franchising when they lack internal resources. Conversely, the
coefficients of cash and cash flow are not statistically significant for unconstrained firms,
as these firms may adopt franchising for reasons other than financial constraints, one of
which is the monitoring cost of divisional managers.
To summarize, financially constrained firms allocate greater cash and cash flow
than unconstrained firms to overcome underinvestment problems, while managers of
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dictatorship firms retain more cash and cash flow than democracy firms to build empires.
Although both underinvestment and overinvestment theories suggest that investment
increases with the available internal funds, they have different policy implications.
Underinvestment theory suggests that firms should retain internal funds to undertake
investments, while overinvestment theory suggests that firms should distribute the
internal funds to the shareholders and raise debt to undertake further investments.
According to the results from the analyses of this study, it can be argued that investmentinternal funds sensitivity is greater for financially constrained firms than for dictatorship
firms. These results suggest that financially constrained firms use mostly internal
resources for investments because of difficulties in raising external finance due to
asymmetric information. Although dictatorship firms also retain internal funds for
investments, these firms could raise external funds to undertake value-increasing
projects; however, managers of dictatorship firms tend to use internal resources to
undertake value-decreasing projects due to the managerial desire to build empires. This
study advances the underinvestment and overinvestment literature by showing the extent
to which the sensitivity of investment to internal funds differs between financially
constrained and dictatorship firms.
The findings of this study have practical implications. Accordingly, hospitality
firms should allocate internal resources efficiently based on the degree of financial
constraints and exposure to empire building to adjust investments to reach the optimal
investment level, where the firm value is maximized. On the one hand, firms with
overinvestment problems should eliminate the ATPs to increase the quality of external
governance mechanism. Reducing the number of ATPs will not only increase the quality
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of external governance mechanism, but it may also drive more institutional investors to
the firm, which increases the quality of internal governance and controls managerial
desire to build empires. Increased quality of internal and external governance will force
managers to distribute the internal resources to the shareholders and to raise external
funds for undertaking positive NPV projects. On the other hand, financially constrained
firms should retain the internal funds to finance all the positive NPV projects to alleviate
the informational asymmetries and to reach the optimal investment level. This study
further contributes to an explanation of the capital scarcity and agency theory of
franchising by examining determinants of franchising investments in hotel firms.
Accordingly, firms adopt franchising due to both capital scarcity and agency cost,
suggesting that franchising could be a way of dealing with asymmetric information and
the monitoring cost of divisional managers. Therefore, financially constrained firms may
expand through the franchising model when they lack internal resources to undertake
value-increasing projects.
Despite its contribution to the corporate finance and franchising literature, this
study has limitations. Although the findings of this study provide significant evidence
that financially constrained firms rely more on internal funds than do dictatorship firms,
the analyses are limited to the sensitivity of investment to internal funds comparisons.
Therefore, future research may investigate the role of internal funds on firm value to
determine the extent to which internal funds affect firm value in financially constrained
and dictatorship firms. While the determinants of franchising investments are analyzed to
test the agency and capital scarcity theories of franchising, future studies are necessary to
examine the determinants of capital investments and the extent to which franchising and
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capital investments affect firm value. Moreover, although the results might be
generalizable to firms in other industries, the analyses are limited to hotel firms. Thus,
testing the theories of underinvestment, overinvestment, and franchising in sample groups
from different industries would corroborate the findings of this study.
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CHAPTER 4
THE VALUE OF CASH HOLDINGS IN HOTEL FIRMS: THE ROLE OF FRANCHISING,
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

4.1 Introduction
The hotel business is one of the most capital-intensive industries in the service
industry (Houthakker, 1979; Tsai & Gu, 2012) because a substantial capital investment is
required to build a new hotel property or to renovate an existing one. Therefore, hotel
firms may need external funds to develop and/or acquire an additional hotel property,
which are common investment strategies in the hotel industry (Canina et al., 2010).
However, the high cost of external finance could turn a positive net present value (NPV)
of an investment to negative due to asymmetric information problems between the
company and outside investors. Firms that face asymmetric information problems do not
undertake all positive NPV investments that require financing beyond the available
internal funds because the opportunity cost of internal finances may be lower than the
opportunity cost of external finances (Myers & Majluf, 1984). As a result, such firms
encounter underinvestment problems due to financial constraints. In other words, they
rely more heavily on internal resources (i.e., cash holdings) to fund their growth due to
the high cost of external finance.
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Therefore, retained cash can be more valuable for financially constrained firms
relative to unconstrained firms. A stream of corporate finance literature finds empirical
evidence that financially constrained firms hold more cash and retain more of their cash
flows than unconstrained firms (Almeida et al., 2004). Furthermore, Faulkender and
Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009) show that the marginal value of cash
holdings is higher for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. This
study examines the effects of financial constraints on the marginal value of cash in the
hotel industry. The marginal value of cash is expected to be higher for financially
constrained hotel firms.
Although greater cash holdings may reduce underinvestment problems, it may
cause overinvestment problems. Jensen (1986) argues that managers of firms with free
cash flows and unused borrowing powers are more likely to complete negative NPV
projects and hence greater cash holdings might be less valuable in poorly-governed firms.
Studies by Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)
report results that are consistent with the view that the marginal value of cash is lower in
firms with agency problems or poor governance mechanisms. This study investigates the
role of corporate governance mechanisms on the marginal value of cash in the hotel
industry. Shareholders would place greater value on the marginal cash holdings in wellgoverned firms relative to poorly-governed firms because empire-building CEOs might
waste the retained marginal cash by investing in value-decreasing projects.
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Even if firms retain internally generated funds in order to eliminate
underinvestment problems, internal funds may not be sufficient to undertake all valueincreasing projects. As an alternative, hotel firms may expand their businesses via the
franchising business investment model, in addition to developing hotel properties or
making acquisitions. The capital scarcity theory of franchising suggests that firms utilize
franchising when they lack the necessary capital to fund their growth because franchisor
firms do not need substantial capital resources for franchising investments (Hunt, 1973;
Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969). Real estate properties comprise the majority of
investments in the hotel industry and they require periodic capital expenditures for
maintenance, renovation, and restoration to sustain the quality of service provided.
Franchising could especially be beneficial for franchisors in the global market because it
allows them to expand into foreign markets while undertaking little or no capital
investment risk. In franchising, the risk is transferred to franchisees in exchange for the
franchisor’s know-how and trademark (Alon et al., 2012). While franchising might be a
practical tool for expansion when firms lack necessary internal resources, the marginal
cash might be more valuable for franchising firms because it allows firms to undertake a
company-owned hotel investment. Shareholders of franchising firms will place greater
value on cash, if franchising is viewed as an investment method to mitigate
underinvestment problems.
Franchising may help solve underinvestment problems, but in the context of hotel
expansion it may exacerbate overinvestment problems. Although hotel firms extensively
rely on franchising for their growth, they continue to make acquisitions, which requires
substantial capital expenditures. The acquisition strategy enables hotel companies to
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grow quickly in both domestic and foreign markets by eliminating the time required for
developing a new hotel project from the ground up. However, an investment that requires
substantial capital spending could be an overinvestment because managers that desire to
build empires may undertake value-decreasing investments with the excess cash holdings
generated through franchising and royalty fees. Shareholders of franchising firms will
place lower value on cash if franchising is perceived to worsen overinvestment problems.
Overall, greater cash holdings could eliminate underinvestment problems or
create overinvestment problems. Extant studies show that the marginal value of cash is
greater for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms (see e.g.,
Faulkender & Wang, 2006) and it is lower for poorly-governed firms than for well
governed firms (see e.g., Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). However, little is known which
of these problems has a greater effect on the marginal value of cash. Furthermore, many
hotel chains start business with few wholly owned establishments, and instead expand
rapidly via franchising. Yet, why firms choose franchising investment model is not clear.
While firms may expand through franchising when they lack internal resources,
franchising might aggravate overinvestment problems. However, this is ultimately an
empirical question.
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which franchising, financial
constraints, and corporate governance affect the marginal value of cash in hotel firms.
First, the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is investigated in order
to determine the marginal value of cash holdings in hotel firms. Second, the effects of
financial constraints and corporate governance on the relation between marginal cash
holdings and firm value are examined in order to determine the extent to which
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asymmetric information or agency problems are more costly for firms. Lastly, the effect
of franchising on the relation between marginal cash holdings and firm value is analyzed
in order to determine why firms adopt franchising investment.
The results show that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially
constrained hotel firms than for unconstrained hotel firms, while it is lower for poorlygoverned firms than for well-governed firms. The coefficient of marginal cash is greater
for financially constrained firms than for poorly-governed firms, suggesting that the
asymmetric information problem is more costly than agency problems. The results from
the examination of the marginal value of cash holdings in firms that expand through
franchising indicates that franchising could be utilized as a solution for underinvestment
problems in financially constrained firms; however, it seems to magnify overinvestment
problems in poorly-governed firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology of this study.
Section 4 presents the results from the analyses of the effects of financial constraints,
corporate governance mechanisms, and franchising on the marginal value of cash.
Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
An extensive body of research suggests that external and internal finances are not
perfect substitutes. Myers and Majluf (1984) assert that entrepreneurs experience
difficulties conveying true information of their firm to the market and thus firms with
asymmetric information problems forego possible growth opportunities because external
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finance is so costly. Fazzari et al. (1988) show that firms are financially constrained if
their investments are highly sensitive to internal funds (i.e., cash and cash flows). While
Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that high investment-internal funds sensitivity indicates that
firms are financially constrained in their investments, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue
that investment cash-flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraint
because it may also be an indication of overinvestments of free cash flows. Jensen (1986)
suggests that managers of firms with free cash flows and unused borrowing powers are
more likely to complete negative NPV projects. In other words, a firm could have high
level of exposure to empire building, if the manager seeks private benefits.
A number of studies have developed methods that measure firms’ quality of
corporate governance mechanisms and degree of financial constraints. Gompers et al.
(2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2006) have developed indices based on antitakeover
provisions (or ATPs, legal regulations that shield firms against hostile takeovers) that
measure the quality of external governance mechanism, which is known as the market for
corporate control that prevents management from undertaking value-decreasing projects.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the presence of larger shareholder groups
increases the quality of internal governance. Cremers and Nair (2005) have developed a
measure that can assess the quality of internal governance mechanism based on the
amount of institutional investors in a firm. Similarly, several indices have been developed
that measure firms’ degree of financial constraints based on the information that firms
disclose on their financial reports (see e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Hadlock & Pierce, 2010;
Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Lamont et al., 2001; Whited & Wu, 2006).
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Consistent with the underinvestment theory, Almeida et al. (2004); Whited and
Wu (2006); Hennessy and Whited (2007); Denis and Sibilkov (2009); and Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) show that financially constrained firms hold more of their cash and cash
flow than unconstrained firms to overcome financial constraints. Furthermore,
Faulkender and Wang (2006) provide evidence that the value of cash is greater for
financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. More recently, Denis and
Sibilkov (2009) find evidence supporting the previous theoretical and empirical studies
that the marginal value of cash holdings is higher for financially constrained firms than
for unconstrained firms. In general, financially constrained firms are expected to use
internal resources to maximize the firm value by undertaking value-increasing projects.
Therefore, shareholders of financially constrained firms place greater value on cash than
unconstrained firms because the marginal cash in financially constrained firms reduces
the underinvestment problems that arise due to the asymmetric information problem (i.e.,
the wedge between external and internal finances). Accordingly, the following
hypotheses are offered based on the theoretical framework of underinvestment:
H1a: There is a positive relationship between the marginal dollar of cash and firm value.
H1b: The marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained firms than for
unconstrained firms.
Although the literature provides substantial evidence that the value of cash varies
across firms based on the degree of financial constraints, a different stream of literature
show that cash has lower value in poorly-governed firms and in firms with agency
problems. Pinkowitz et al. (2006), investigating the effects of corporate governance
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mechanisms on the value of internal funds, show that the value of cash is lower in firms
with agency problems or weak governance practices relative to well-governed firms.
Similarly, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) provide empirical support consistent with this
view that the marginal value of cash is lower in firms with agency problems or poor
governance mechanisms. In other words, shareholders of weakly governed firms place
lower value on the marginal cash holdings. Masulis et al. (2007) demonstrate evidence in
favor of the overinvestment theory that managers of poorly-governed firms make poorer
investments relative to managers of well-governed firms. Therefore, managers of poorlygoverned firms retain internal funds to undertake investments that benefit them but not
necessarily the shareholders; that is, managers of firms with desire to build empires may
waste the marginal cash in value-decreasing projects and create overinvestment
problems. Accordingly, overinvestment theory predicts the following hypotheses:
H2a: There is a negative relationship between the marginal dollar of cash and firm value.
H2b: The marginal value of cash is lower for poorly-governed firms than for wellgoverned firms.
While Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that firms bypass projects that require
external finance due to asymmetric information problems, financially constrained firms
might utilize franchising to eliminate such underinvestment problems. If a firm is
financially constrained, franchising might help because franchising requires little or no
capital investment and immediately generates cash flows. Oxenfeldt and Thompson
(1968-1969) propose the capital scarcity theory of franchising to explain why firms adopt
it. According to this theory, firms that cannot raise external finance choose the
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franchising business investment model for expansion and growth. While there are a
number of studies that examine determinants of franchising investment, results are
mixed. However, previous studies that test the capital scarcity theory of franchising
assume a monotonic relationship between firms’ internal resources and franchising
investments (see e.g., Brickley et al., 1991; Combs & David J., 1999). The capital
scarcity of firms may vary across firms and hence while some firms adopt franchising
due to capital scarcity, other may adopt franchising for different reasons. That is, the
capital scarcity theory’s propositions may only pertain to financially constrained firms.
Therefore, the hypothesis, which postulates that all franchising firms face financial
constraints, is inappropriately deduced from the capital scarcity theory in former
empirical studies. A method that measures firms’ degree of financial constraints is
necessary to test the extent to which firms adopt franchising due capital scarcity or
financial constraints. Recently developed financial constraint indices (see e.g., Almeida et
al., 2004; Hadlock & Pierce, 2010; Hennessy & Whited, 2007; Lamont et al., 2001;
Whited & Wu, 2006) could be used to measure the extent to which firms face financial
frictions and hence rely on internal resources and/or franchising for investments.
Although financially constrained firms could adopt franchising as a solution to
underinvestment problem, firms that adopt franchising might as well face overinvestment
problems if they are exposed to empire building. In other words, managers’ mission
might not be aligned with that of shareholders. In the case of franchising firms, cash
flows generated through franchisees might lead managers to undertake value-decreasing
investments that require substantial capital spending such as mergers and acquisitions
(Lang et al., 1991). Such deals have been very frequent in hospitality industry in the last
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two decades, with over 800 mergers and acquisitions (Chatfield, Chatfield, & Dalbor,
2012). Consequently, managers of hospitality firms might invest in negative NPV
projects with the cash flow generated through franchised divisions rather than distributing
dividends to shareholders.
Accordingly, shareholders of franchising firms will place greater value in cash, if
franchising is pursued as an investment method to mitigate underinvestment problems.
However, shareholders will place a lower value on franchising firms if franchising is
viewed as exacerbating overinvestment problems. Therefore, the following hypothesis is
proposed based on the franchising theories:
H3: There is a relationship between the marginal dollar of cash and the value of
franchising firm.
While a positive relationship between the marginal cash and firm value suggests
that firms expand through franchising to eliminate underinvestment problems, a negative
relationship between the marginal cash and firm value indicates that franchising
exacerbates overinvestment problems. It is also possible that some firms adopt
franchising to reduce underinvestment problems, while for other firms the choice to use
franchising is related to overinvestment problems. On the one hand, the marginal value of
cash is expected to be higher for financially constrained firms that use franchising than
for unconstrained franchising firms. On the other hand, shareholders of poorly-governed
franchising firms will place lower value on cash relative to well-governed franchising
firms. Therefore, the following hypotheses are drawn from the theoretical frameworks of
under- and overinvestment, respectively:
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H4: The marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained franchising firms
than for unconstrained franchising firms.
H5: The marginal value of cash is lower for poorly-governed franchising firms than for
well-governed franchising firms.
4.3 Methodology
Multivariate analyses are employed to uncover the extent to which the marginal
value of cash differs between constrained and unconstrained; between dictatorship and
democracy; and between franchising and non-franchising firms. The observations with
missing dependent variables are removed from the analysis and the observations with
missing independent variables are replaced by the firm’s median values. All the variables
are winsorized from 1% and 99% level to eliminate the effects of outliers.
Ordinary least square (OLS) analysis may yield biased standard errors if the
Gauss-Markov assumptions of OLS are violated. Therefore, the residuals of the model
must be diagnosed to determine whether the estimated coefficients are best linear and
unbiased (BLUE) (Gujarati, 2003). The residuals are diagnosed for the presence of
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation utilizing White (1980) and Wooldridge (2002)
tests, respectively. However, the models’ residuals appear to suffer from
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Wooldridge (2002) recommends the use
of feasible generalized least square (FGLS) because it corrects for the heterogeneity and
autocorrelation and produces robust standard errors. Therefore, multivariate analyses are
conducted utilizing FGLS to account for the heterogeneity and autocorrelation problems
in the models. Furthermore, FGLS produces asymptotically normally distributed
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coefficient estimates, which relaxes the normality assumption of the OLS (Parks, 1967).
Variance Inflation factors are further assessed for multicollinearity and all the values in
all the models yield acceptable results. Hence, the estimated parameters of the models are
reliable.
The following models are applied to examine the relationship between marginal
cash and the firm value and the marginal value of cash for financially constrained,
poorly-governed, and franchising firms relative to unconstrained, well-governed, and
firms, which do not adopt franchising, respectively:
𝐸𝑅!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝐶!" + 𝛽! 𝑀𝐶!" 𝐹𝐶 + 𝐹𝐶 +

!
!!! 𝛽! 𝑋!"

+ 𝑒!"

(1)

𝐸𝑅!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝐶!" + 𝛽! 𝑀𝐶!" 𝐺 + 𝐺 +

!
!!! 𝛽! 𝑋!"

+ 𝑒!"

(2)

𝐸𝑅!" = 𝑎! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝐶!" + 𝛽! 𝑀𝐶!" 𝐹 + 𝐹 +

!
!!! 𝛽! 𝑋!"

+ 𝑒!"

(3)

where ER is the firm i’s excess stock returns at time t, MC is the firm i’s change
in cash at time t, FC is a financial constraints dummy variable, G is a corporate
governance dummy or index variable, F is the franchising dummy variable, and X
represents a set of control variables of the firm i at time t that includes the change in noncash, change in earnings, leverage, and net financing. 𝑒 is the error term and 𝑎! , 𝛽! , 𝛽! ,
𝛽! , 𝛽! , 𝛽! , and 𝛽! are the models’ parameters.
4.3.1 Data and Variable Construction
The sample of this study consists of public hotel companies in the United States
(US) over the period of 1993-2013. The sample period begins in 1993 because company
filings are only available then through the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)
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EDGAR database. The dependent, independent, and control variables and the data for
constructing the financial constraint indices are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual
database. The institutional block holdings data, which is used as a proxy for constructing
the internal governance proxy, is obtained from Thomson Financial Institutional
Holdings (13F) Database. The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) publishes
the 24 antitakeover provisions (ATP), which decrease the ability of the investors to
replace the manager, for about 2,000 large corporations. However, the publications do not
comprise the firms in this study sample. Therefore, the data for constructing external
governance proxies are hand-collected from firms’ 14-A, S-1, S-4, S-11, F-1, F-4, and
10-K statements, certificate of incorporation, and the shareholders’ rights plan that are
available on the SEC EDGAR. The final sample consists of 392 firm-year observations
with 41 unique firms.
The dependent variable, excess stock return (or firm value), is the stock return
over a fiscal year minus the return on a beta-matching portfolio. The benchmark portfolio
is adapted from the forty-eight Fama- French value-weighted portfolios. Accordingly, the
excess stock return is calculated as follows.
𝑅!" =

!!"
!!"!!

−1

(4)

𝐸𝑅!" = 𝑅!" − 𝐵𝑅!"

(5)

where 𝑅 is the excess stock i’s return during year t; 𝑃 is the fiscal year closing price for
stock i on year t (item 199); 𝐸𝑅 is the excess stock i’s return during year t; 𝐵𝑅 is the
return of stock i’s benchmark portfolio during year t.
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The independent variable is the change in cash (or marginal cash), which is
measured by cash and short-term investments (item 1) in year t minus cash and shortterm investments in year t-1. Based on the methodology used in the studies of Faulkender
and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009), the following variables are included in
the models to control for the changes in the firm’s profitability and book assets net of
cash and the firm’s leverage and net financing. Change in non-cash is measured by book
assets (item 6) in year t minus book assets in year t-1 less change in cash; change in
earnings is measured as interest (item 15) plus earnings before extraordinary items (item
18) deferred taxes credits (item 50), and investment tax credits (item 51) in year t minus
earnings in year t-1; leverage, which is defined as the ratio of total debt (item 9 + item
34) to total assets (item 6) in year t; and net financing, which is measured by the sale of
common and preferred stock (item 108) minus purchase of common and preferred stock
(item 115) plus long term debt issuance (item 111) minus long term debt redemption
(item 114). Independent and control variables are adjusted by lagged market equity,
which is defined as the number of common shares (item 54) times the fiscal year closing
price for stock i on year t (item 199), with the exception of leverage. Therefore, the
coefficient of change in cash indicates the marginal value of cash. Corporate governance
and financial constraint indices are applied to categorize firms as constrained and
unconstrained and dictatorship and democracy portfolios based on the degrees of
financial constraints and corporate governance mechanisms, respectively. Furthermore,
constrained (FC), governance (G) and franchising (F) dummy variables are created,
where FC takes the value of one if the firm is financially constrained and zero otherwise;
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G takes the value of one if the firm is poorly-governed and zero otherwise; and F takes
the value of one if the firm is a franchising company and zero otherwise.
Three financial constraint indices are utilized to measure firms’ financial
constraint levels. Specifically, the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ) index, the Cleary
index (Hennessy & Whited, 2007), and the Size and Age (SA) index are utilized to
classify firms as constrained and unconstrained. The, KZ, Cleary, and SA financial
constraint indices are constructed following the methodologies used in Lamont et al.
(2001), Hennessy and Whited (2007), and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), respectively as
follows.
𝐾𝑍 = −1.00019×𝐶𝐹 – 39.36×𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 – 1.3×𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 0.282×𝑄 + 3.139×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 (6)
𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑦 = −0.12×𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇 − 1.90×𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐷 + 0.001×𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 + 1.46×𝐼𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺 +
2.03×𝑆𝐺 − 0.05×𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾

(7)

𝑆𝐴 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = −0.737×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 0.043×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ! – 0.040×𝐴𝑔𝑒

(8)

where CF is the cash flow, which is the income before extraordinary items (item 18) plus
depreciation and amortization (item 14) divided by total assets (item 6); TDIV is the total
dividends (item 21+ item 19) divided by total assets (item 6); Cash is the cash and shortterm investments (item 1) divided by total assets (item 6); Q is the Tobin’s Q; TLTD is
the total long term debt (item 9) divided by total assets (item 6); SG is the firm’s real
sales growth; CURAT is the current assets (item 4) divided by current liabilities (item 5);
COVER is the interest coverage and measured as earning before interest and taxes (item 3
minus item 14) over interest expense (item 15) plus preferred dividend payments (item
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19) divided by one minus tax rate, where tax rate equals to income taxes (item 16)
divided by operating income before depreciation (item 13) minus depreciation and
amortization (item 14) minus interest expense (item 15); IMARG is the net income (item
18) divided by sales (item 12); and SLACK is the financial slack measured as cash and
short-term investments (item 1) plus 0.5 times inventory (item 3) plus 0.7 times accounts
receivable (item 2) minus short term loans (item 196) divided by net fixed assets (item 8).
Size is natural logarithm of total assets; and Age is the number of years the firm has been
on Compustat with non-missing financial data information. Items are Compustat annual
items. A higher score of the indices indicates more financial constraints and hence higher
underinvestment problems. The firms are sorted into two portfolios as constrained (upper
tercile; i.e., firms that have upper 33% of index values) and unconstrained (bottom
tercile; i.e., firms that have lower 33% of index values) based on the KZ, Cleary, and SA
financial constraint index values.
Three corporate governance indices are utilized to identify firms’ quality of
governance mechanisms. Gompers et al. (2003) analyze the effects of the external
governance mechanism on firm value using an external governance index that consists of
24 ATPs and find that managers protected by more ATPs make poorer investments.
Increased numbers of ATPs reduce the disciplinary role of market for corporate control
and provide weaker shareholders’ rights, which, in turn, make it difficult to replace the
manager. In other words, more ATPs increase agency cost between managers and
shareholders; hence, managers are more likely to build empires. Similarly, Bebchuk et al.
(2006) examine the effects of the external governance mechanism on the value of firms
using an alternative index that only consists of six of the 24 ATPs used by Gompers et al.
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(2003). They conclude that while this parsimonious index negatively affects the firm
value, the remaining 18 ATPs do not affect the firm value. The six ATPs are presence of
a staggered board, limit to shareholders bylaw amendments, limit to shareholders charter
amendments, golden parachutes, supermajority requirement to approve a merger, and
poison pills. Similarly, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) investigate the presence of a
staggered board effect on the value of the firm and find that firms with a staggered board
of directors have significantly lower firm value. Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
show that the existence of large investors increases the quality of internal governance.
Along the same line, Cremers and Nair (2005) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)
analyze the effect of internal governance mechanism using the percentage shareholding
by institutional investors that are greater than 5% on the firm value and find that firm
value increases with increased amount of institutional investors. The external governance
index (BCF Index), which consists of six ATPs, is constructed following the criteria used
in Bebchuk et al. (2006). The six provisions are the presence of a staggered board,
limitation on amending corporate bylaws, limitation on amending the charter,
supermajority requirement to approve a merger, golden parachutes, and poison pill.
Basically, the BCF index is the total number of firms’ ATPs that takes the value from one
to six, where higher values indicate poor external governance and hence higher
overinvestment problems. Following Bebchuk et al. (2006), firms are sorted into
dictatorship (i.e., poorly-governed) and democracy (i.e., well governed) portfolios based
on the firms’ number of ATPs, where firms with three or more ATPs are included in the
dictatorship portfolio, while firms with two or less ATPs are included in the democracy
portfolio. Also, following Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), firms are sorted into dictatorship
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and democracy portfolios based on the presence of a staggered board, where firms with a
staggered board are included in the dictatorship portfolio, while firms without a staggered
board are included in the democracy portfolio. As a measure of internal governance
mechanism, institutional block holdings is utilized following Cremers and Nair (2005)
and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). Similarly, firms are sorted into dictatorship and
democracy portfolios based on the firms’ amount of institutional investors, where firms
that have institutional ownership 5% or less of the firm’s outstanding shares are included
in the dictatorship portfolio, while firms that have institutional ownership greater than 5%
of the firm’s outstanding shares are included in the democracy portfolio.
4.3.2 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of dependent and independent, financial constraints, and
corporate governance index variables are presented in Table 4.1 along with the
correlation matrix of these variables.
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations

Mean

Std.
Dev.
26.43
0.09
93.01
6.03
4.11
1.82

Excess
Return
1
-0.11b
-0.10b
-0.22a
0.05
-0.02

Cash

KZ
Index

SA
Index

Cleary
Index

BCF
Index

Staggered
Board

Excess Return
-8.56
Cash
0.07
1
KZ Index
-67.49
-0.07
1
SA Index
1.90
-0.05
-0.04
1
Cleary Index
-0.37
0.05
-0.18a
0.01
1
BCF Index
3.58
-0.13a
0.00
0.07
0.11b
1
Staggered
c
0.69
0.45
0.03
-0.02 -0.08
-0.03
0.06
0.30a
1
Board
Block
0.08
0.14
0.01
-0.03
-0.01
-0.06
-0.05
0.03
0.07
Holdings
a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively based on two-sided tests.
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Three different measures of financial constraints and corporate governance indices are
used to assess the extent to which these indices capture the same information in terms of
financial constraints and corporate governance mechanisms of firms in this study sample.
While the KZ index is negatively correlated with the Cleary and SA financial constraints
indices, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation between
the KZ and Cleary index. Although the sign of the correlation coefficient between the
Cleary and SA index is positive, it is statistically insignificant. The indices that measure
the corporate governance mechanisms are positively correlated with each other.
However, the correlation coefficient is only statistically significant for the relation
between the BCF index and the staggered board. These results suggest that different
financial constraints and corporate governance indices capture different information.
Therefore, the use of different measures of financial constraints and corporate governance
mechanisms is important to obtain more information about firms’ degrees of financial
constraints and corporate governance mechanisms. According to the results from the
correlation analysis, excess return is negatively correlated with cash and the correlation
coefficient is statistically significant at 5% significant level.
4.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the regression analyses that examine the
relationship between marginal cash and the firm value, as well as effects of financial
constraints, corporate governance mechanisms, and franchising the relationship between
marginal cash and the firm value. Firms are grouped as financially constrained and
unconstrained and poorly- and well-governed based on the financial constraints and
corporate governance indices. The relationships are estimated utilizing the FGLS
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regression analysis to determine the effects of financial constraints, corporate governance
mechanisms, and franchising on the marginal value of cash in hotel firms. Table 4.2
presents the regression analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the firm value without
subjecting the sample to a financial constraints or corporate governance criteria (column
1) and based on the financial constraint indices controlling for firms’ financial
characteristics.
Table 4.2 Value of Cash Holdings: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Firms
Financial
Constraints Criteria

No Criteria (1)

KZ Index (2)

SA Index (3)

Cleary Index (4)

2.97a (6.09)

1.80a (3.35)

3.30a (4.87)

1.61b (2.22)

Constrained*Change
in Cash

5.14a (4.97)

-0.70 (-0.72)

2.59b (2.52)

Constrained dummy

0.47 (0.79)

0.35 (0.44)

-0.93 (-1.54)

Independent
Variables
Change in cash

Control Variables
Change in non-cash

0.04a (13.05)

0.04a (12.42)

0.04a (12.21)

0.04a (11.30)

Change in earnings

-0.01 (-0.17)

-0.01 (-0.28)

-0.01 (-0.09)

0.01 (0.97)

Leverage

0.01 (0.93)

0.01 (1.45)

0.01 (0.97)

0.01 (0.45)

Net financing

0.01 (0.54)

0.01 (0.83)

0.01 (0.53)

0.01 (0.88)

-33.87a (-19.62)

-34.07a (-20.12)

-33.97a (-19.54)

-33.51a (-19.47)

392

392

392

392

Intercept
Number of obs.

Wald test of joint
9184.07
9805.40
9200.52
9383.77
significance
The dependent variable is stock returns over the fiscal year minus the returns from forty-eight FamaFrench value-weighted portfolios. All regressions control for year effects. Robust z statistics are in
parentheses. a and b indicate 1 and 5 statistical significance levels, respectively based on two sided tests.
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Before interpreting the coefficient estimates, overall significance of the model
must be investigated. Wald statistic, which is a test of the joint significance of the
coefficient estimates, shows that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model.
The coefficient of change in cash (or the marginal value of cash) in Column 1 of Table 2
shows that the marginal value of cash is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01).
The coefficient of the change in cash shows the value of marginal cash in firms, which is
2.97 dollar based on the column 1. Columns 2, 3, and 4 include the financial constraints
dummy variables and an interaction term in order to capture the difference in the
marginal value of cash between constrained and unconstrained firms. Although the
coefficients of change in cash fluctuate between 1.61 and 3.30, they are still positive and
statistically significant based on the financial constraints criteria in columns 2, 3, and 4.
KZ and Cleary financial constraints indices provide evidence that cash is more valuable
in financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms, as the coefficients of the
interaction term, constrained change in cash, is positive and significant in columns 2
(p<0.01) and 4 (p<0.05). However, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and
statistically insignificant based on the SA financial constraints index. Accordingly, the
marginal value of cash is between 2.59 and 5.14 dollar higher for financially constrained
firms than for unconstrained firms. Therefore, the results support the underinvestment
hypotheses (H1a and H1b) that there is a positive relationship between the marginal cash
and firm value and that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained
firms than unconstrained firms. In contrast, the results fail to support the hypothesis
(H2a), based on the overinvestment theory, that there is a negative relationship between
the marginal cash and firm value. These results support the findings in studies that
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examine the underinvestment theory (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Faulkender & Wang,
2006) that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained firms than for
unconstrained firms.
Table 4.3 Value of Cash Holdings: Poorly vs. Well Governed Firms
Corporate Governance
Criteria

BCF Index (1)

Staggered Board (2)

Block Holdings (3)

4.79a (6.30)

4.67a (5.48)

2.48a (4.21)

-2.97a (-3.09)

-2.59b (-2.41)

1.79 (1.53)

0.20 (0.34)

-0.43 (-0.72)

0.63 (1.06)

Change in non-cash

0.04a (13.54)

0.04a (13.15)

0.04a (12.88)

Change in earnings

-0.01 (-0.13)

-0.01 (-0.13)

-0.01 (-0.05)

Leverage

0.01 (0.66)

0.01 (0.69)

0.01 (0.94)

Net financing

0.01 (0.35)

0.01 (0.42)

0.01 (0.63)

-33.92a (-19.80)

-33.57a (-19.05)

-34.15a (-19.58)

392

392

392

Independent Variables
Change in cash
Governance*Change in
Cash
Governance dummy
Control Variables

Intercept
Number of obs.

Wald test of joint
9417.98
9351.75
9277.01
significance
The dependent variable is stock returns over the fiscal year minus the returns from forty-eight
Fama-French value-weighted portfolios. All regressions control for year effects. Robust z
statistics are in parentheses. a and b indicate 1 and 5% statistical significance levels, respectively
based on two sided tests.

Table 4.3 shows the regression analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the firm value
based on the corporate governance indices controlling for firms’ financial characteristics.
Wald statistics show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. The
coefficients of change in cash (or the marginal value of cash) in Columns 1, 2, and 3 of

106

Table 4.3 shows that the marginal value of cash, which ranges between 2.48 and 4.79
dollar, is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). The interaction term, governance
change in cash, illustrates the difference in the marginal value of cash between poorly
and well-governed firms. The results from columns 1 and 2 show that cash is less
valuable in poorly-governed firms relative to well-governed firms, based on the BCF
index and staggered board criteria, and the coefficients are statistically significant.
Although the results from the column 3 demonstrate the opposite, the coefficient
of the interaction term is statistically insignificant. The marginal value of cash is lower,
ranging between 2.59 and 2.97 dollar, for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed
firms. Therefore, the results support the hypothesis (H2b), drawn from the
overinvestment theory, that the marginal value of cash is lower for poorly-governed firms
than for well-governed firms. These results complements the findings in studies that
examine the overinvestment theory (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al.,
2006) that the marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy
firms.
Table 4.4 presents the regression analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the
franchising firm value, controlling for firms’ financial characteristics. Wald statistics
show that the coefficients are jointly significant for each model. The columns 1, 3, and 4
of Table 4.4 present the analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the franchising firm
value when the sample is restricted to franchising firms, while column 2 shows the
analysis of the marginal cash holdings on the firm value for the full sample and including
the franchising dummy variable.
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Table 4.4 Value of Cash Holdings: Franchising Firms
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-7.30a (-3.47)

3.28a (6.73)

-13.96a (-5.54)

1.07 (0.49)

Independent Variables
Change in cash

-10.98a (-3.66)

Franchising*Change in
Cash

16.55a (4.29)

Constrained*Change in
Cash

-22.44a (-6.45)

Governance*Change in
Cash
Franchising dummy

0.23 (0.35)

Constrained dummy

-0.92 (-1.04)

Governance dummy

0.19 (0.23)

Control Variables
Change in non-cash

-0.20 (-0.36)

0.04a (13.23)

0.29 (0.56)

0.18 (0.39)

Change in earnings

0.01 (0.10)

-0.01 (-0.14)

-0.01 (-0.11)

0.01 (0.12)

Leverage

0.01b (2.36)

0.01 (0.63)

0.01c (1.89)

0.01c (1.84)

Net financing

0.03a (3.91)

0.01 (0.19)

0.02a (3.43)

0.02b (2.40)

-35.11a (-7.47)

-33.75a (-19.83)

-33.53a (-7.75)

-35.12a (-8.95)

90

392

90

90

Intercept
Number of obs.

Wald test of joint
5296.17
9512.31
6436.31
7822.52
significance
The dependent variable is stock returns over the fiscal year minus the returns from forty-eight
Fama-French value-weighted portfolios. All regressions control for year effects. Robust z statistics
are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate 1, 5, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively
based on two sided tests.

The coefficient of change in cash (or the marginal value of cash) in column 1 of Table 4.4
shows that the marginal value of cash is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01).
The results from the analysis, which is based only the sample of franchising firms, in
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column 1 suggests that on average the marginal cash has a negative value in franchising
firms. To further delineate these findings and to compare the difference in the marginal
value of cash between franchising and non-franchising firms, a franchising dummy
variable along with an interaction term of the franchising dummy variable and change in
cash, franchising change in cash, are included in the model. Column 2 of Table 4.4 shows
that while the marginal value of cash is positive and significant (3.28, p<0.01), marginal
cash is less valuable in franchising firms relative to firms that do not adopt franchising.
Although the findings suggest that franchising firms’ investors put lower value on
a marginal dollar, it is not clear whether the relatively lower value of marginal cash is due
to under- or overinvestment problems. To test this intuition, a financial constraints and
corporate governance dummy variables are included in the analyses in columns 3 and 4
along with interaction terms, where financial constraints and corporate governance
dummy variables are interacted with the change in cash variable, respectively. Parallel
with the results from the analysis presented in column 1 of Table 4.4, the column 3 shows
that the marginal value of cash is negative and statistically significant in franchising
firms. Conversely, the results from the analysis in column 4 shows that the coefficient of
marginal value of cash flips signs and loses significance. Yet, the coefficient of
interaction term, constrained change in cash, is positive and significant (16.55, p<0.01),
suggesting that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained
franchising firms than unconstrained franchising firms. Furthermore, the coefficient of
interaction term, governance change in cash, is negative and significant (-22.44, p<0.01),
which indicates that cash is less valuable in poorly-governed franchising firms relative to
well-governed franchising firms. The results support hypotheses (H3, H4, and H5),
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which posit that franchising firms differ depending on their financial constraints and
governance. That is, the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained
franchising firms than unconstrained franchising firms, while it is lower for poorlygoverned franchising firms compared to well-governed franchising firms.
4.5 Conclusions
In perfect capital markets, where there are no asymmetric information problems, a
positive NPV project is a value-increasing investment for the firm regardless of how the
project is financed because the opportunity costs of external (i.e., debt and/or equity) and
internal resources (i.e., cash) do not diverge. However, firms’ investment and financing
decisions are not independent of each other. Some firms face underinvestment problems
if their cash is not sufficient (Myers & Majluf, 1984), while other firms face
overinvestment problems when managers seek personal benefits from using firms’
resources to build empires (Jensen, 1986). This study examines the relationship between
firm value and marginal cash in the hotel industry based on the firms’ degrees of
financial constraints and the quality of corporate governance mechanisms. The hotel
industry is chosen to investigate these effects for the following reasons. Similar to
financially constrained firms in other industries, financially constrained hotel firms might
retain available internal funds to undertake value-increasing investments. Unlike other
industries, however, hotel firms expand their businesses via the franchising business
investment model when their internal funds are not sufficient to undertake all valueincreasing projects. Although firms take on the franchising model as a means to reduce
underinvestment problems, franchising might exacerbate overinvestment problems in
poorly-governed hotel firms. Franchising firms generate excess cash through franchise
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and royalty fees from their franchisees. While financially constrained firms are expected
to undertake value-increasing projects, managers of poorly-governed firms might invest
in negative NPV projects. Therefore, the hotel industry provides a unique setting to
investigate of the effects of under- and overinvestment problems on the marginal value of
cash.
The results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings is greater for
financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms, which suggests that financially
constrained firms retain more of their cash to undertake positive NPV projects that would
have been abandoned if internal resources were insufficient. Put differently, shareholders
of financially constrained firms place higher value on the amount of increased cash
holdings than do shareholders of unconstrained firms. More specifically, this study finds
that a one-dollar increase in cash holdings increases firm value between 2.59 and 5.14
dollars in financially constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms. This finding
likely reflects the fact that constrained firms’ shareholders perceive the greater cash
holdings as a solution to the underinvestment problems.
Additionally, this study sorts firms into dictatorship (i.e., poorly-governed) and
democracy (i.e., well-governed) portfolios to determine the extent to which the marginal
value of cash holdings varies between poorly and well-governed firms. The results show
that the marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy firms,
suggesting that managers of firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms keep
more of their cash. This result is consistent with entrenched managers increasing their
personal wealth or other benefits by investing in negative NPV projects that would have
been rejected if firms’ cash were insufficient. In other words, shareholders of poorly-
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governed firms put lower value on the amount of increased cash holdings than do
shareholders of well-governed firms. In particular, the marginal value of cash is 2.97
dollars lower in firms that have more than two ATPs relative to firms that have two or
less ATPs. It is 2.59 dollars lower in firms that have a staggered board of directors. These
results are consistent with managers of firms being protected by ATPs so that higher
ATPs are more often associated with poorer investment decisions and overinvestment
problems.
Analyzing the marginal value of cash in financially constrained and poorlygoverned firms allows comparison of the costs of under- and overinvestment problems.
Accordingly, this study provides indirect evidence that financial constraints
(underinvestment problems), on average, has more effect on the marginal value of cash
than poor corporate governance mechanisms (overinvestment problems).
Although firms may expand through franchising to avoid underinvestment
problem, franchising might intensify overinvestment problems because the availability of
excess cash might make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. However, the
determinants of franchising have not been previously examined from the overinvestment
perspective. The results from preliminary analysis that does not categorize firms based on
the degrees of financial constraints or the quality of corporate governance mechanism
show that the marginal value of cash is negative, in which one dollar increase in cash
decreases firm value by 7.30 dollar, for franchising firms. These results indicate that
shareholders of franchising firms perceive that managers are likely to waste the increased
cash in value-decreasing projects, such as investing in a company-owned division that
has a negative NPV. This intuition is supported when the marginal value of cash in
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franchising firms are compared with the non-franchising firms that the marginal value of
cash is 10.98 dollar lower for franchising firms relative to non-franchising firms.
However, when franchising firms are sorted into constrained and unconstrained and
poorly- and well-governed categories, the results change dramatically. On the one hand,
the marginal value of cash is 16.55 dollar higher for financially constrained franchising
firms than unconstrained franchising firms, suggesting that shareholders of franchising
firms put place greater value in cash because greater cash holdings allow these firms to
expand through company-owned division by avoiding costly external finances. In other
words, financially constrained firms retain more of their cash to expand through
company-owned divisions rather than franchised divisions, which would have been the
case if internal resources were insufficient. On the other hand, the marginal value of cash
is 22.44 dollar lower for poorly-governed franchising firms than well governed
franchising firms, which indicates that shareholders of poorly-governed franchising firms
perceive that managers retain more of their cash to increase their wealth by investing in
negative NPV projects that would have turned down if external resources are needed.
Accordingly, while financially constrained firms may expand through franchising to
eliminate underinvestment problems, poorly-governed franchising firms make themselves
vulnerable to overinvestment problems, where managers of poorly-governed franchising
firms waste the greater cash holdings by pursuing projects that increase their wealth but
not necessarily the shareholders.
The practical implications of this study are noteworthy. While some hotel firms
are financially constrained and hence they face underinvestment problems, majority of
hotel firms seem to have poor governance mechanisms and hence they are subject to
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overinvestment problems. Financially constrained hotel firms should retain more of their
cash instead of distributing them to shareholders or expand through franchising to
eliminate underinvestment problems. While well-governed firms could also keep more of
their cash or expand through franchising to grow their businesses, franchising might
exacerbate overinvestment in poorly-governed firms. That is, obtaining cash through
franchising and royalty fees might make overinvestment easier for empire building
CEOs, who should not have kept excess cash in the first place. These results suggest that
both franchising and retained cash allow managers of firms to expand their operations.
While expanding through franchising or excess cash creates value in financially
constrained firms, stock market investor should watch for firms with more than two ATPs
and less than five percent institutional investors, as these firms will have poor governance
mechanisms and are likely to waste firms’ resources.
Despite its significant contribution to the existing corporate finance and
franchising literature, this study is not free from limitations. Although this study provides
significant evidence that financially constraints (underinvestment problems) has more
effect on the firm value than weak corporate governance mechanisms (overinvestment
problems), the analyses are restricted to the analyses of the marginal value of cash
utilizing financial constraints and corporate governance proxies. Future studies are
needed that examine the sensitivity of investment to internal funds, the effects of capital
expenditures on firm value, and the extent to which mergers and acquisitions affect firm
value to corroborate the findings of this study. This study shows that franchising could be
due to eliminate both under- and overinvestment problems by providing indirect evidence
that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially constrained and well-governed
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franchising firms than for unconstrained and poorly-governed franchising firms,
respectively. However, future studies are required to investigate the determinants of
investments in franchising firms by analyzing the association between marginal
investments and firm value. Also, while the results of this study can be generalizable, the
analyses are constrained to hotel firms; hence, testing these theories in different industry
samples could substantiate the outcomes of this study.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, to examine why investments
that require substantial capital, such as acquisitions, create value in some firms while they
reduce value in other firms by examining the effects of financial constraints, corporate
governance mechanisms, and franchising and REIT organizational forms on hotel firms’
investments. Second, to investigate the role of internal funds on capital investments based
on firms’ degrees of financial constraint and exposure to empire building in the
hospitality industry. Third, to analyze the relationship between firm value and marginal
cash based on firms’ degrees of financial constraint and the quality of corporate
governance mechanisms in the hotel industry to determine which one of these problems
has more of an effect on the marginal value of cash. Figure 5.1 presents these proposed
relationships.
In a perfect capital market, a positive NPV project is a value-increasing
investment for the firm, regardless of how firms choose to finance their projects because
the opportunity costs of external (i.e., debt and/or equity) and internal resources (i.e.,
cash) do not diverge (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, in an imperfect capital
market, firms’ investment and financing decisions are not independent of each other. This
dependence may result in two outcomes that are detrimental to the firm value.
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On the one hand, firms could face underinvestment problems if they do not have
enough cash to undertake a positive NPV project because raising external funds increases
the project’s cost (Myers & Majluf, 1984).

Financial
Constraints
(+)

(+)

(+)
(+) (-)

Cash

Investment
(+) (-)

Firm Value

(+) (-)

(+) (-)

Franchising/
REIT

(+) (-)

(+) (-)

(+)

(+)

(-)
(-)

(+)

Poor Corporate
Governance

Cash Flow

Figure 5.1 The Nomological Network: An Illustration of the Under- and Overinvestment
Theoretical Frameworks
Firms with underinvestment problems (i.e., financially constrained firms) retain more of
their cash to undertake value-increasing projects and reduce underinvestment problems.
Greater cash holdings allow financially constrained firms to undertake positive NPV
investments that would have otherwise been abandoned due to the premium on external
finances relative to firms’ cash. Shareholders of financially constrained firms place
higher value in retained cash relative to shareholders of unconstrained firms,
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On the other hand, firms’ internal resources may create overinvestment problems
if the manager of a firm seeks personal benefits from investing in projects beyond the
level that maximizes firm value (Jensen, 1986). Managers of firms with weak corporate
governance mechanisms hold more of their cash to exploit personal benefits through
investments in value-decreasing projects. This managerial desire creates overinvestment
problems. Shareholders of firms with weak governance mechanisms or agency problems
place lower value in cash holdings compared to value placed by well-governed firms’
shareholders.
Although increased cash and cash flows might alleviate underinvestment
problems, they may create overinvestment problems. Both problems depreciate firm
value. The marginal value of cash is lower for poorly governed firms than for wellgoverned firms due to agency problems (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al.,
2006). Parallel with these arguments, former studies have found that the marginal value
of cash is greater for financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms due to
asymmetric information problems (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Faulkender & Wang, 2006).
It is evident that both underinvestment and overinvestment theories propose that the
availability of internal funds increases investments (Fazzari et al., 1988; Jensen, 1986;
Myers & Majluf, 1984). It is less well understood the extent to which the investmentinternal funds sensitivity varies between firms with underinvestment problems and firms
with overinvestment problems. This dissertation examines shareholders’ reactions to
news of acquisitions in the hotel industry to determine whether under- or overinvestment
is a major problem in this industry.

118

Both under- and overinvestment theories suggest that investments increase with
the available internal funds. However, these theories have different implications.
Investment-internal funds sensitivity and retained cash in poorly-governed firms indicate
overinvestment problems. Conversely, this sensitivity and accumulated cash indicate
underinvestment problems in financially constrained firms. This dissertation seeks to
explain whether under- or overinvestment is a more detrimental problem for a firm in the
hotel industry.
The hotel industry is chosen to investigate effects of under- and overinvestment
problems for three reasons. First, building an additional hotel requires substantial capital
investments and time. Hence, hotel firms commonly use mergers and acquisitions as a
prevalent corporate strategy to accelerate their expansions (Canina et al., 2010). An
acquisition could be a value-increasing or decreasing project for a firm. Second, contrary
to the firms in other industries, such as manufacturing industries, hotel firms utilize the
franchising investment model to expand their operations, which requires little or no
capital investment. Franchising could be an efficient investment model for financially
constrained hotel firms (Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968-1969). Franchising could also
make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. An investment that requires
substantial capital spending in franchising firms could be an overinvestment because
managers that desire to build empires may undertake value-decreasing investments with
the excess cash holdings generated through franchising and royalty fees. Third, in
addition to the traditional form of corporate structure (i.e., C-corporation), hotel firms
extensively adopt the REIT organizational form, which might further affect under- and
overinvestment problems. Unlike the C-corporation structure, hotel-REITs must
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distribute 90% of their earnings to the shareholders. Firms with agency problems may
adopt the REIT organizational form to legally force managers to distribute most of firms’
income to shareholders. However, a hotel-REIT might be constrained from making
positive NPV investments because they will be left with only 10% of their income. The
hotel industry provides a unique setting to investigate the effects of under- and
overinvestment problems on the firm value and investments.
Firms are classified into constrained and unconstrained portfolios using the KZ,
WW, SA, and Cleary financial constraint indices to determine the extent to which firm
value, investment-internal funds sensitivity and the marginal value of cash vary between
constrained and unconstrained firms. The results show that financially constrained firms
gain significantly higher returns than unconstrained firms in acquisitions, suggesting that
acquisitions could be a way of dealing with the informational asymmetries for
constrained firms. Firms with underinvestment problems move toward the optimal
investment level, where the firm value is maximized, by undertaking an additional
investment.
Financially constrained firms rely more on internal funds than do unconstrained
firms, suggesting that financially constrained firms accumulate their internally generated
funds to undertake value-increasing projects. These results substantiate the findings in
previous empirical studies that examine the underinvestment theory (see e.g., Almeida et
al., 2004; Denis & Sibilkov, 2009; Fazzari et al., 1988). The findings support the
underinvestment theory propositions that the opportunity cost of external funds is higher
than the opportunity cost of internal funds due to informational asymmetries. Financially
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constrained firms rely on internal funds in order to invest in positive NPV projects and
move toward the optimal investment level, where the firm value is maximized.
The marginal value of cash holdings is greater for financially constrained firms
than for unconstrained firms, which suggests that financially constrained firms retain
more of their cash to undertake positive NPV projects that would have abandoned if
internal resources were insufficient. In other words, shareholders of financially
constrained firms place higher value in the amount of increased cash holdings than do
shareholders of unconstrained firms. More specifically, one dollar increase in cash
holdings increases the firm value between 2.59 and 5.14 dollar more in financially
constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms because constrained firms’
shareholders perceive the greater cash holdings as a solution to the underinvestment
problems that arise due to the informational asymmetries. These results support the
findings in studies that examine the underinvestment theory (Denis & Sibilkov, 2009;
Faulkender & Wang, 2006) that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially
constrained firms than for unconstrained firms.
In a separate set of analyses, firms are further categorized as dictatorship and
democracy portfolios in order to determine the extent to which firm value, investmentinternal funds sensitivity, and the marginal value of cash vary between dictatorship and
democracy firms. The results show that firms with poor governance mechanisms
experience negative gains from acquisitions relative to the firms with better governance
mechanisms. Managers of firms that are protected by more ATPs make poorer
acquisitions in which they destroy value by overinvesting in negative NPV projects and
shift firms away from the optimal investment level.
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Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for dictatorship firms, which are
exposed to empire building, than for democracy firms. The results substantiate the
overinvestment theory propositions of Jensen (1986). Empire-building managers of firms
with excess internal resources might make value-decreasing investments, which drive
firms above the optimal investment level and create overinvestment problems. Although
the overinvestment theory predicts that investment-internal funds sensitivity is higher in
firms that are exposed to empire building, this is the first study that analyzes the
sensitivity of investment to internal funds in this context by using recently developed
corporate governance proxies. The findings of this dissertation advance the literature by
providing empirical evidence that supports the theoretical arguments of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and Stein (2003) that investment-internal funds sensitivity could be due
to the managerial desire to build empires.
The marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy
firms. This result suggest that managers of firms with weak corporate governance
mechanisms keep more of their cash to increase their wealth by investing in negative
NPV projects. In other words, shareholders of poorly-governed firms place lower value in
the amount of increased cash holdings than do shareholders of well-governed firms. In
particular, the marginal value of cash is 2.97 dollar lower in firms that have more than
two ATPs relative to firms that have two or less ATPs; and 2.59 dollar lower in firms
with the presence of a staggered board of directors. The difference in the marginal value
of cash between poorly and well-governed firms is due to the fact that managers of firms
protected by more ATPs are more likely to make poorer investment decision and create
overinvestment problems. These results complements the findings in studies that examine
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the overinvestment theory (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006) that the
marginal value of cash is lower for dictatorship firms than for democracy firms.
Analyzing the effects of financial constraints and corporate governance
mechanisms allows the comparison of the under- and overinvestment effects on the firm
value, investment-internal funds sensitivity, and the marginal value of cash holdings.
These comparisons determine the extent to which under- or overinvestment problems are
more problematic for a firm and hence show whether under- or overinvestment problems
are more value-decreasing. Financially constrained firms allocate greater cash and cash
flow than unconstrained firms to overcome underinvestment problems, while managers
of dictatorship firms retain more cash and cash flow than democracy firms to build
empires. Although both underinvestment and overinvestment problems deteriorate firm
value, these theories have different policy implications. Underinvestment theory suggests
that firms should retain internal funds to undertake investments, while overinvestment
theory suggests that firms should distribute the internal funds to the shareholders and
raise debt to undertake further investments. The results show that while one unit decrease
in the quality of corporate governance decreases firm value by 0.8% based on BCF index,
one unit increase in financial constraint increases firm value by 29% and 13% based on
WW Index and SA Index, respectively. A marginal investment increases firm value more
in underinvesting firms than it decreases firm value in overinvesting firms.
While the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is 0.72 for financially constrained
firms based on the Cleary index, it is 0.23 for dictatorship firms based on the block
holdings proxy. Similarly, the sensitivity of investment to cash is 0.50 for financially
constrained firms based on the KZ index, while it is 0.40 for dictatorship firms based on
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the BCF index. Investment-internal funds sensitivity is greater for financially constrained
firms than for dictatorship firms. While investments increase with the availability of
internal funds, firms that face underinvestment problems rely more on internal funds than
do firms with overinvestment problems. These results suggest that financially constrained
firms use mostly internal resources for investments because of difficulties in raising
external finance due to asymmetric information. Although dictatorship firms also retain
internal funds for investments, these firms could raise external funds to undertake valueincreasing projects. Managers of dictatorship firms tend to use internal resources to
undertake value-decreasing projects due to the managerial desire to build empires. This
dissertation advances the underinvestment and overinvestment literature by showing the
extent to which the sensitivity of investment to internal funds differs between financially
constrained and dictatorship firms. First, the opportunity cost of external funds is higher
than the opportunity cost of internal funds due to informational asymmetries; hence,
financially constrained firms rely more on cash in order to invest in positive NPV
projects. Second, managers of dictatorship firms are likely to undertake value-decreasing
projects by retaining excess cash to build empires. Underinvestment theory suggests that
firms should preserve more of their cash to undertake value-increasing investments and
hence marginal cash holdings are perceived more valuable in financially constrained
firms than unconstrained firms. The marginal value of cash holdings in financially
constrained firms indicates the wedge between external and internal finances (i.e., the
cost of asymmetric information), which ranges between 2.59 and 5.14 dollar.
Overinvestment theory, however, suggests that firms should distribute the cash to
shareholders and seek external finances to undertake additional investments and thus
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greater cash holdings are less valued in dictatorship firms than democracy firms. The
marginal value of cash holdings in firms with weak governance mechanisms shows the
cost of agency problems, which fluctuates between 2.59 and 2.97 dollar. The results from
the analyses in this dissertation provide indirect evidence that financial constraints
(underinvestment problems), on average, have more effect on the marginal value of cash
than poor corporate governance mechanisms (overinvestment problems).
The determinants of franchising investments are also examined to test the agency
and capital scarcity theory postulations. On the one hand, the agency theory of
franchising posits that franchisors’ experience in developing a franchise system reduces
the cost of franchise contracts, which decrease franchisees’ cost of free riding on the
trademark. Firms are more likely to expand through franchising investments with
increased experience in franchising. The agency theory of franchising also posits that the
cost of free riding is higher for the divisions that require high levels of investments and
hence firms will own the unit that requires high levels of investment rather than
franchising it.
On the other hand, the capital scarcity theory argues that firms undertake
franchising investment when they do not have sufficient internal resources. While
underinvestment theory suggests that firms should abandon the projects that need
financing beyond the available internal resources (Myers & Majluf, 1984), the capital
scarcity theory of franchising argues that firms may expand through franchising when
they have insufficient internal resources for financing the growth through companyowned expansions because franchising demands no or little capital investment (Oxenfeldt
& Thompson, 1968-1969). Previous studies that test the propositions of capital scarcity
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theory conduct the analysis by pooling all the firms that adopt franchising in a single
sample assuming that all firms that adopt franchising are financially constrained. In this
dissertation, firms that adopt franchising are sorted into financially constrained and
unconstrained categories in order to compare the extent to which constrained and
unconstrained firms depend on internal funds to undertake franchising investments. Put
simply, using financial constraint indices, this dissertation solves the methodological flaw
that exists in previous empirical studies regarding the identification of firms’ financial
constraint levels.
Although firms may expand through franchising to avoid underinvestment
problem, franchising might intensify overinvestment problems because the availability of
excess cash might make overinvestment easier for empire-building CEOs. An investment
that requires substantial capital expenditures in franchising firms could be an
overinvestment if managers are not aligned with the shareholders. Empire-building CEOs
may make value-decreasing investments with the excess cash holdings generated through
franchising and royalty fees. The determinants of franchising have not been previously
examined from the overinvestment perspective. This dissertation expands the franchising
literature, first, by examining the extent to which franchising is due to financial
constraints using indices that measure firms’ financial constraints to resolve the
identification problem existing in previous studies; and second, by testing whether
franchising exacerbate managerial desire to build empires.
The results show that shareholders of franchising companies perceive acquisitions
negatively. Although there is a positive relationship between acquisition returns and
degree of financial constraints, the constrained franchising indicator shows that
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shareholders perceive acquisitions negatively. However, the coefficient of franchising
variable loses significance and changes its sign when the interaction variable is included.
The negative and significant coefficient of franchising suggests that the franchising firms
overinvest. The positive and significant coefficients of lagged franchised divisions in all,
constrained, and unconstrained firms’ samples provide evidence in favor of the agency
theory postulation in Lafontaine (1992) that firms undertake more franchising
investments with increased experience in franchising. The negative returns of franchising
hotels provide support for the agency theory of franchising that monitoring cost of
divisional managers are higher than the cost of franchisees’ to free ride on the trademark
because the expansion of the hotel business will take place in geographic areas that are
remotely located vis-à-vis the headquarters. The negative coefficients of relative deal size
in all specifications fail to provide support for the agency theory of franchising that with
increased level of investment firms will own the division rather than franchising it.
The relation between the proportion of franchised divisions and internal funds is
not significant when the analysis is conducted by pooling all the firms that adopt
franchising in a single sample. However, the relation between proportion of franchised
divisions and cash flow is negative for financially constrained firms, suggesting that
financially constrained firms expand through franchising when they lack internal
resources. Conversely, the coefficients of cash and cash flow are not statistically
significant for unconstrained firms. These firms may adopt franchising for eliminating the
monitoring cost of divisional managers. The results from preliminary analysis that does
not categorize firms based on the degrees of financial constraints show that the marginal
value of cash is negative. One-dollar increase in cash decreases firm value by 7.30 dollar
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for franchising firms. These results indicate that shareholders of franchising firms
perceive that managers are likely to waste the increased cash in value-decreasing
projects, such as investing in a company-owned division that has a negative NPV. This
intuition is supported when the marginal value of cash in franchising firms are compared
with the non-franchising firms that the marginal value of cash is 10.98 dollar lower for
franchising firms relative to non-franchising firms. However, when franchising firms are
sorted into constrained and unconstrained portfolios, the results change dramatically. The
marginal value of cash is 16.55 dollar higher for financially constrained franchising firms
than unconstrained franchising firms, suggesting that shareholders of franchising firms
place greater value in cash because greater cash holdings allow these firms to expand
through company-owned division by avoiding costly external finances. Financially
constrained firms retain more of their cash to expand through company-owned divisions
rather than franchised divisions, which would have been the case if internal resources
were insufficient. These results support the findings in Combs and David J. (1999), which
show that while some firms adopt franchising due to financial constraints, others may
adopt franchising due to agency costs. Franchising firms are further sorted into poorly
and well-governed portfolios to examine the extent to which franchising exacerbate the
overinvestment problems. The results show that the marginal value of cash is 22.44 dollar
lower for poorly governed franchising firms than well governed franchising firms, which
indicates that shareholders of poorly governed franchising firms perceive that managers
retain more of their cash to increase their wealth by investing in negative NPV projects
that would have turned down if external resources are needed. Analyses of the marginal
value of cash in franchising firms based on the degrees of financially constraints and the

128

quality of corporate governance mechanisms contributes to the explanation of
determinants of franchising. While financially constrained firms may expand through
franchising to eliminate underinvestment problems, poorly governed franchising firms
make themselves vulnerable to overinvestment problems. Managers of poorly governed
franchising firms waste excess cash holdings by pursuing projects that increase their
wealth but not necessarily the shareholders.
This dissertation further investigates the effects of the REIT organizational form
on hotel firm value and the extent to which this organizational form affects firms’ underand overinvestment problems. Regardless of the degree of financial constraints and
corporate governance mechanisms, the negative sings of REIT in all specifications
suggests overinvestment problems. While poorly governed REIT firms’ acquisitions are
also positively received, the constrained REIT firms’ acquisitions are perceived
negatively. These results either imply that hotel-REITs tend to overinvest or the financial
constraints and corporate governance indices do not well capture the constraints and
governance. The positive sign of poorly governed REIT implies that the overinvestment
is not due to poor corporate governance mechanisms, but rather these firms are
financially constrained because they are over-levered or highly expanded prior to making
acquisitions.
In summary, acquisitions are positively received when they indicate higher
financial constraints that impede investments, while they are negatively viewed when
they are an indication of empire building. The results show that investments that move
firms toward the optimal investment level affect firm value more than investments that
shift firms beyond the optimal investment level. On the one hand, managers of firms with
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weak corporate governance mechanisms are likely to make poorer acquisitions by
undertaking value-decreasing investments, which create overinvestment problems and
move firms above the optimal investment level. Corporations need to institute external
and internal corporate governance mechanisms to control such managerial desire. In
particular, firms with higher ATPs should eliminate provisions and attract more
institutional investors to increase the quality of internal and external corporate
governance mechanisms and refrain from value-decreasing acquisitions.
On the other hand, financially constrained firms are expected to undertake valueincreasing investments by using their internal resources to mitigate informational
asymmetries, which create underinvestment problems and forces firms to operate below
the optimal investment level. Financially constrained firms have limited funds but higher
unexploited investment opportunities and thus they undertake value-increasing projects
using internal resources or stocks. Financially constrained firms may be able to reduce
the wedge between external and internal finance in acquisitions, where informational
asymmetries between the acquiring firms and the target company could be fewer in
relation to the capital markets (Alshwer et al., 2011; Khatami et al., 2014). Financially
constrained firms should make investments that require substantial capital expenditure
through acquisitions, as acquisitions could be a method of reducing informational
asymmetries for those firms.
While franchising could be an alternative method of investment to mitigate underand/or overinvestment problems, the results provide evidence against the general notion
in previous studies that examined the theories of franchising and found that franchising is
only due to either capital constraints or agency costs (see e.g., Combs & David J., 1999;
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Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988). On the contrary, franchising firms experience
significantly negative gains from acquisitions, suggesting that franchising could be a
tactic for dealing with overinvestment problems. While financially constrained firms may
fund the growth opportunities via franchising model, franchising firms should take
restrictive actions to control managers from making acquisitions. Although there seems to
be additional factors that might explain why unconstrained firms adopt franchising,
postulations of the agency theory of franchising are partially supported.
Hotel-REIT organizational form does not seem to cause underinvestment
problems; however, it does eliminate overinvestment problems. These results suggest that
distributing the free cash flows to shareholders halts managerial desire to build empires.
These findings indicate that the firms with high payout ratio (90% in the REIT case) are
not necessarily financially constrained, as opposed to the findings in J. Kim and Jang
(2012) that use Tobin’s Q, which is an inferior proxy in capturing financial constraints
and thus it could be misleading (Whited & Wu, 2006), to classify firms as financially
constrained and unconstrained.
The findings of this dissertation provide support for the financial constraints
indices of the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ), the Whited and Wu (2006) (WW), the
Size and Age (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010) (SA), and the Cleary (Hennessy & Whited, 2007)
in terms of measuring firms degrees of financial constraints. Also, this dissertation
complements the corporate governance proxies developed by Bebchuk et al. (2006),
Cremers and Nair (2005), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) in terms of the efficacy of
these proxies to measure the managerial desire to build empires. This dissertation fails to
provide support for the presence of a staggered board, which is recommended by
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Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), as a proxy for exposure to empire building or corporate
governance.
The results of this dissertation have practical implications. These findings may
help guide managers to allocate internal resources efficiently based on the degrees of
financial constraint and exposure to empire building, and ultimately to adjust investments
based on optimal investment level, where the firm value is maximized. Firms may
improve investment policies and expanding through different investment models, such as
franchising, and whether to register as C-corporation or REITs. The results also give
guidance to shareholders on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in controlling
managers’ empire-building preferences. Hospitality firms should allocate internal
resources efficiently based on the degree of financial constraints and exposure to empire
building to adjust investments to reach the optimal investment level, where the firm value
is maximized. On the one hand, firms with overinvestment problems should eliminate the
number of ATPs to increase the quality of external governance mechanism. Reducing the
number of ATPs will not only increase the quality of external governance mechanism,
but it may also drive more institutional investors to the firm, which increases the quality
of internal governance and controls managerial desire to build empires. Increased quality
of internal and external governance will force managers to distribute the internal
resources to the shareholders and to raise external funds for undertaking positive NPV
projects. In particular, institutional shareholders create block holdings within the
company with their voting power, which enhances the quality of internal governance
mechanism. Improved internal and external governance mechanisms could impose the
distribution of the excess cash to shareholders and hence managers will be forced to seek
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external finances to undertake positive NPV projects. Pursuing external finances for a
project through debt or equity markets will institute an additional control mechanism on
managers, as these markets will not fund a negative NPV project.
On the other hand, financially constrained firms should retain their internal funds
to finance all the positive NPV projects to alleviate the informational asymmetries and to
reach the optimal investment level. This dissertation further contributes to an explanation
of the capital scarcity and agency theory of franchising by examining determinants of
franchising investments in hotel firms. Firms adopt franchising due to both capital
scarcity and agency cost, suggesting that franchising could be a way of dealing with
asymmetric information and the monitoring cost of divisional managers. Financially
constrained hotel firms may expand through the franchising model when they lack
internal resources to undertake value-increasing projects. Financially constrained firms in
other industries with growth prospects should expand through franchising when they
have insufficient cash to undertake positive NPV projects to avoid the costly external
finances because franchising does not require substantial capital investment.
Corporations could adopt franchising as an additional corporate governance
mechanism to solve overinvestment problems. Put simply, managers of franchising firms
might be less likely to waste the marginal cash in value-decreasing projects because
financing the growth through franchised divisions does not demand major capital
expenditures and thus managers are expected to distribute the marginal cash to
shareholders because these firms could raise external funds to expand through companyowned divisions if the project has a positive NPV. However, franchising alone is not
sufficient to resolve overinvestment problems, rather it could be used as an additional
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corporate strategy to improve the corporate governance mechanism of a firm. While
hotel-REITs are more likely to make value-increasing investments, improvement of
external corporate governance mechanism in hotel-REITs could make this corporate
structure more efficient than C-corporation hotels.
Although the findings of this dissertation make significant contributions to the
corporate finance, franchising, and hospitality literature, this dissertation is not free from
limitations. While this dissertation reports significant evidence that underinvestment is
more depreciating than overinvestment, the analyses are limited to gains from
acquisitions. Future studies may examine the effects of different investments on the firm
value. Although this dissertation provides significant evidence that financial constraint
(underinvestment problems) has more effect on the firm value than weak corporate
governance mechanisms (overinvestment problems), future studies are needed to examine
the effects of capital expenditures on the firm value to corroborate the findings of this
dissertation. In a model where market share is considered as an investment, Chevalier
(1995) showed that managers with a desire to build empires could overinvest in the
market share. While increasing the market share increases the sales and ultimately
benefits the managers, it may not benefit the shareholders. Firms that adopt the
franchising business investment model might be overinvesting in the market share by
increasing the number of franchised divisions. Future studies may investigate the
franchising firms’ overinvestment behavior on the market share. The determinants of
capital investments in firms that adopt franchising are examined to test the agency and
capital scarcity theories of franchising. Future research is needed to investigate the
determinants of franchising investment. Future studies may investigate the determinants
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of investments in franchising firms by analyzing the association between marginal
investments and firm value. While the results of this dissertation can be generalizable, the
analyses are constrained to hotel firms. Testing the underinvestment, overinvestment, and
franchising theories using different samples of industries would substantiate the results of
this dissertation. The results from the OLS analysis that examines the effects of corporate
governance on the firm value yield low Adjusted R-square values. Although these low
values could be seen as a limitation or constraints due to small sample size, studies in
corporate finance literature that examines these issues reports similar results. Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2007), who has developed the internal corporate governance index using
3,950 observations, report R-square values of 0.02 and 0.04. Therefore, the small
numbers are not due to small sample sizes. Rather, these low values are due to the nature
of such studies. Although unobservable effects of firms’ financial policies and investment
opportunities might create omitted variable bias, firms’ investment and financial policies
and investment opportunities are not disclosed because of the crucial competition factors
that determine a firm’s success. Instead, alternative proxies are used to capture firms’
policies from information available to the public. Yet, corporate finance studies may still
have low explanatory powers due to the possible omitted variables. Therefore, future
models employing additional explanatory, macro and firm level, variables might improve
the explained variance.

135

REFERENCES
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.
Almeida, H., Campello, M., & Weisbach, M. S. (2004). The cash flow sensitivity of cash.
The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1777-1804.
Alon, I., Ni, L., & Wang, Y. (2012). Examining the determinants of hotel chain
expansion through international franchising. International Journal of Hospitality
Management, 31(2), 379-386. doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2011.06.009
Alshwer, A. A., Sibilkov, V., & Zaitats, N. (2011). Financial Constraints and the Method
of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions. Working Paper, Available at SSRN
1364455.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic
Studies, 58(2), 277-297.
Avery, C., Chevalier, J. A., & Schaefer, S. (1998). Why do managers undertake
acquisitions? An analysis of internal and external rewards for acquisitiveness. The
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 14(1), 24-43.
Beals, P., & Arabia, J. V. (1998). Lodging REITs. The Cornell Hotel and Restaurant
Administration Quarterly, 39(6), 52-59.

136

Bebchuk, L., & Cohen, A. (2005). The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial
Economics, 78(2), 409-433. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2006). What matters in corporate governance?
Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 783-827. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
Brickley, J. A., & Dark, F. H. (1987). The chioce of organizational form: The case of
franchising. Journal of Financial Economics, 18(2), 401-420.
Brickley, J. A., Dark, F. H., & Weisbach, M. S. (1991). An Agency Perspective on
Franchising. Financial Management, 20(1), 27-35.
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event
studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31.
Canina, L., Kim, J.-Y., & Ma, Q. (2010). What we know about M&A success: A research
agenda for the lodging industry. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 51(1), 81-101.
doi:10.1177/1938965509354448
Caves, R. E., & Murphy, W. F. (1976). Franchising: Firms, markets, and intangible
assets. Southern Economic Journal, 42(4), 572-586.
Chatfield, H. K., Chatfield, R., & Dalbor, M. (2012). Returns to hospitality acquisitions
by method of payment. The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management, 20(1),
1-16. doi:10.1080/10913211.2012.10721888
Chen, S.-S., & Ho, K. W. (1997). Market Response to Product-Strategy and CapitalExpenditure Announcements in Singapore: Investment Opportunities and Free
Cash Flow. Financial Management, 26(3), 82-88.

137

Chevalier, J. A. (1995). Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of
the Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing. The Journal of Finance, 50(4),
1095-1112.
Christie, W. G., & Nanda, V. (1994). Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and the
Undistributed Profit Tax of 1936 and 1937. The Journal of Finance, 49(5), 17271754.
Combs, J. G., & David J., K. J. (1999). Can capital scarcity help agency theory explain
franchising? Revisiting the capital scarcity hypothesis. Academy of Management
Journal, 42(2), 196-207.
Combs, J. G., & Ketchen, D. J. (2003). Why do firms use franchising as an
entrepreneurial strategy?: A meta-analysis. Journal of Management, 29(3), 443465. doi:10.1016/S0149-2063(03)00019-9
Cremers, K. J. M., & Nair, V. B. (2005). Governance mechanisms and equity prices. The
Journal of Finance, 60(1), 2859-2894.
Denis, D. J., & Sibilkov, V. (2009). Financial constraints, investment, and the value of
cash holdings. Review of Financial Studies, 23(1), 247-269.
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp031
Devereux, M., & Schiantarelli, F. (1990). Investment, Financial Factors, and Cash Flow:
Evidence from U.K. Panel Data. In Asymmetric information, corporate finance,
and investment (pp. 279-306). University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Dittmar, A., & Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007). Corporate governance and the value of cash
holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 83(3), 599-634.
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.006

138

Doukas, J. (1995). Overinvestment, Tobin’s q and gains from foreign acquisitions.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 19(7), 1285-1303.
Faulkender, M. W., & Wang, R. (2006). Corporate financial policy and the value of cash.
The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1957-1990.
Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G., Petersen, B. C., Blinder, A. S., & Poterba, J. M. (1988).
Financing constriants and corporate investment. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1988(1), 141-206.
Fazzari, S. M., & Peterson, B. C. (1993). Working Capital and Fixed Investment- New
Evidence on Financing Constraints. The RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3), 328342.
Franzoni, F. (2009). Underinvestment vs. overinvestment: Evidence from price reactions
to pension contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(3), 491-518.
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.06.004
Fuller, K., Netter, J., & Stegemoller, M. (2002). What do returns to acquiring firms tell
us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions. The Journal of Finance,
57(4), 1763-1793.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107-156.
Graf, N. S. (2009). Stock market reactions to entry mode choices of multinational hotel
firms. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 28(2), 236-244.
doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2008.08.002

139

Greenwald, B., Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1984). Informational Imperfections in the
Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. The American Economic
Review, 74(2), 194-199.
Gu, Z., & Kim, H. (2003). An examination of the determinants of hotel REITs'
unsystematic risk. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 27(2), 166-184.
doi:10.1177/1096348003027002002
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic econometrics (4 ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2010). New evidence on measuring financial constraints:
Moving beyond the KZ index. Review of Financial Studies, 23(5), 1909-1940.
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq009
Hennessy, C. A., & Whited, T. M. (2007). How Costly Is External Financing? Evidence
from a Structural Estimation. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1705-1745.
Heron, R., & Lie, E. (2002). Operating performance and method of payment in takeovers.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37(1).
Houthakker, H. S. (1979). Growth and inflation: Analysis by industry. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 1979(1), 241-256.
Hunt, S. D. (1973). The trend toward company-operated units in franchise chains.
Journal of Retailing, 49(2), 3-12.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers.
The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983). The market for corporate control: The scientific
evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), 5-50.

140

Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide
useful measure of financing constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(1), 169-215.
Khatami, S. H., Marchica, M.-T., & Mura, R. (2014). Corporate acquisitions and
financial constraints. Working Paper, Available at SSRN 2246644.
Kim, H., Mattila, A. S., & Gu, Z. (2002). Performance of hotel real estate investment
trusts: A comparative analysis of Jensen indexes. International Journal of
Hospitality Management, 21(1), 85-97.
Kim, J., & Jang, S. (2012). Do hotel REIT companies face investment constraints? A
comparison with C-corporation hotel companies. International Journal of
Hospitality Management, 31(2), 573-578. doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2011.08.002
Lafontaine, F. (1992). Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results. RAND
Journal of Economics, 23(2), 263-283.
Lamont, O. (1997). Cash flow and investment: Evidence from internal capital markets.
The Journal of Finance, 52(1).
Lamont, O., Polk, C., & Saa-Requejo, J. (2001). Financial constraints and stock returns.
The Review of Financial Studies, 14(2), 529-554.
Lang, L. H. P., Stulz, R. M., & Walking, R. A. (1989). Managerial performance, Tobin's
Q, and the gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics,
24(1), 137-154.
Lang, L. H. P., Stulz, R. M., & Walking, R. A. (1991). A test of the free cash flow
hypothesis: The case of bidder returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 29(2),
315-335.

141

MacKinnon, J. G., & White, H. (1985). Some heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance
matrix estimators with improved finite sample properties. Journal of
Econometrics, 29(3), 305-325.
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and acquirer returns.
The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1851-1889.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297.
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004). Firm size and the gains from
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(2), 201-228.
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Coporate financing and investment decision when
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial
Economics, 13(2), 187-221.
Nicolau, J. L. (2002). Assessing new hotel openings through an event study. Tourism
Management, 23(1), 47-54.
Norton, S. W. (1988). An empirical look at franchising as an organizational form. The
Journal of Business, 61(2), 197-218.
Oxenfeldt, A. R., & Kelly, A. O. (1968-1969). Will successful franchise systmes
ultimately become wholly-owned chains? Journal of Retailing, 44(4), 69-83.
Oxenfeldt, A. R., & Thompson, D. N. (1968-1969). Franchising in perspective. Journal
of Retailing, 44(4), 3-13.
Parks, R. W. (1967). Efficient estimation of a system of regression equations when
disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 62(318), 500-509.

142

Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., & Williamson, R. (2006). Does the contribution of corporate
cash holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance? A crosscountry analysis. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2725-2751.
Roh, Y. S., & Kwag, H. M. (1997). The ownership structure of property rights: Theory
and empirical evidence of restaurant franchising. Journal of Hospitality &
Tourism Research, 21(2), 75-85.
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. The Journal of Business,
59(2), 197-216.
Rubin, P. H. (1978). The theory of the firm and structure of the franchise contract.
Journal of Law and Economics, 21(1), 223-233.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal
of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
Stein, J. C. (2003). Agency, information and corporate investment. In G. M.
Constantinides, M. Harris, & R. M. Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of
Finance (1 ed., Vol. 1): Elsevier Science B. V.
Travlos, N. G. (1987). Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms'
stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 42(4), 943-963.
Tsai, H., & Gu, Z. (2012). Optimizing room capacity and profitability for Hong Kong
hotels. Journal of Travel & Tourism Marketing, 29(1), 57-68.
doi:10.1080/10548408.2012.638563
Vogt, S. C. (1994). The cash flow/investment relationship: evidence from U.S.
manufacturing firms. Financial Management, 23(2), 3-20.

143

Vogt, S. C. (1997). Cash flow and capital spending: evidence from capital expenditure
announcements. Financial Management, 26(2), 44-57.
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 48(4), 817-838.
Whited, T. M. (1992). Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment: Evidence
from Panel Data. The Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1425-1460.
Whited, T. M., & Wu, G. (2006). Financial constraints risk. Review of Financial Studies,
19(2), 531-559. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj012
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

144

